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PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS' USE OF EQUITABLE
REMEDIES UNDER THE RICO STATUTE:




Since its enactment in 1970, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations statute' (RICO) increasingly has
become a vehicle through which the federal government has
attacked corruption of labor unions by organized crime. In
1989, for example, the government used the RICO statute to
reform the electoral and disciplinary procedures of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the IBT or Team-
sters);2 and just last year, the government brought a civil
RICO suit seeking appointment of an administrator for the
New York Waterfront and appointment of trustees for several
locals of the International Longshoremen's Association.3
Despite the opportunities that the RICO statute offers for
constructive union reform, private litigants have yet to seek
RICO equitable remedies against labor unions. This article
explains how the government has prosecuted civil RICO cases
against labor unions and suggests how private litigants might
use the RICO statute to achieve similar equitable reform of
labor unions. In describing the government's approach to
* Randy M. Mastro is a former Assistant United States Attorney and Deputy
Chief of the Civil Division of the Office of the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York. He was the lead prosecutor in the Government's civil
RICO action against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. He is a graduate
of Yale University, B.A. 1978, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D.
1981. He is currently an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in New York City.
** Steven C. Bennett is an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. He is a graduate of
Macalester College, B.A. 1979, and New York University Law School, J.D. 1984.
*** Mary P. Donlevy is currently an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in
New York City. She is a graduate of Pepperdine University, B.A. 1986, and Columbia
University School of Law, J.D. 1989.
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901a, 84 Stat.
922, 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
2. Consent Order, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ.
4486 (S.D.N.Y.) (Mar. 14, 1989); see infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
3. Complaint, United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 732
F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 90 Civ. 0963) (Feb. 14, 1990); see infra notes 87-90
and accompanying text.
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prosecuting civil RICO actions against labor unions, the
authors aim to provide a road map for private litigants to avail
themselves'of the types of equitable remedies achieved in prior
civil RICO cases.
Prior to the enactment of the RICO statute, the federal
government's supervision of labor unions principally entailed
enforcement of the labor laws, coupled with criminal prosecu-
tions of corrupt individuals.4  This limited approach to
regulation sometimes permitted unions with sordid histories
to remain mired in corruption even in the midst of scrutiny by
the Labor Department and other regulatory and law enforce-
ment agencies.5 Moreover, union dissidents, constrained by
the same labor laws and ostracized by their own leadership,
had to rely largely on occasional government intervention for
the limited reforms that were available.6
The RICO statute radically changed the regulatory land-
scape. In RICO, the government has found a new and potent
weapon to fight corruption of labor unions by organized
crime.7 RICO has given federal courts the freedom to fashion
creative equitable remedies to redress racketeering activity.
Under RICO, even at the preliminary stage, "the court may at
any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take
4. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1969) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT].
5. For example, both the Secretary of Labor and the courts found the Teamsters'
system of selecting delegates responsible for electing national officers to be in
technical compliance with the labor laws. See Theodus v. McLaughlin, 852 F.2d 1380,
1384-86 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
6. In the case of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Teamsters for a
Democratic Union (TDU), a dissident group, made several unsuccessful attempts to
reform the Teamsters' election process through litigation. See, e.g., id. at 1381-82.
Unable to effect changes, union reformers have had to rely on government prosecu-
tions of corrupt elected officials. Four of the last five Teamsters presidents were
indicted while in office. Three of them (David Beck, James Hoffa and Roy Williams)
were convicted of felonies. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE:
ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS, AND LABOR UNIONS 89-90 (1986) [hereinafter THE
EDGE]; see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); United States v.
Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United
States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971). The
fourth (Jackie Presser) was under indictment on federal felony charges at the time
of his death. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 613 (2d
Cir. 1990) (discussing United States v. Friedman, No. 86-114 (N.D. Ohio 1986), which
named Presser as co-defendant).
7. In a recent civil RICO action against the Teamsters, the government was
able to reform the Teamsters election process. See Consent Order, United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y.) (Mar. 14, 1989). As part
of the settlement of that lawsuit, the Teamsters Union has been required for the first
time ever to elect its top officers by direct, rank-and-file, secret ballot. Id. at 13.
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such other actions ... as it shall deem proper."8  Thus, the
RICO statute has given the government a means to change the
way corrupt unions elect their officers, discipline their officers
and members, and otherwise conduct their operations. 9
The fact remains, however, that the government has used
this "extraordinary" weapon "very sparingly."10 In the two
decades since the statute was passed, the government has
brought few civil RICO actions against labor unions.' These
cases have involved unions plagued by "systemic corruption"
for "so many years" that a "drastic" remedy was necessary.' 2
In short, the government has sought RICO relief against labor
unions only in the most egregious circumstances.
Nevertheless, through its early successes with the statute,
the government has established extremely valuable prece-
dents, the benefits of which private litigants may be able to
share. Unlike the government, whose primary concern is
eliminating union corruption,' 3 private litigants may have a
completely different agenda in bringing a civil RICO action
against a labor union. Because RICO affords previously
unavailable equitable remedies, union reformers now have
within their grasp a weapon that works. They simply need to
use it.
Part I of this Article outlines the government's approach to
civil RICO actions involving labor unions, including an
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1988).
9. In connection with the Teamsters settlement, Benito Romano, the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, explained the value of the
RICO statute: "There would have been no [other] way that I could think of... that
would have afforded us the broad-based relief that we think we needed in order to
achieve systematic reform." Federal Government's Use of Trusteeships Under the
RICO Statute: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1989) [hereinafter
RICO Hearings].
10. Id. at 57 (statement of Benito Romano, United States Attorney, Southern
District of New York).
11. See, e.g., United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610 (2d
Cir. 1990); United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 889 F.2d 1232 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 879
F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile, & Composition
Roofers, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); United States v.
Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1140 (1986); United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 732 F. Supp.
434 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, 663 F.
Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
12. RICO Hearings, supra note 9, at 57 (statement of Benito Romano, United
States Attorney, Southern District of New York).
13. See id. at 23.
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overview of the government's prior civil RICO actions and a
summary of the types of issues that often arise in such
actions. Part II examines the unique issues involved in a civil
RICO action brought by a private plaintiff. The principal
issue addressed in this Part is whether a private plaintiff can
bring an action under the equitable remedies provisions of the
RICO statute. This Part also addresses the issues of how a
private plaintiff can gain access to information that may be
required to prosecute a civil RICO action and how a private
plaintiff could pay for such an action.
I. THE GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO CIVIL RICO ACTIONS
This Part addresses the issues that prior government civil
RICO actions have raised. Any civil RICO action by a private
plaintiff likely would raise many of the same issues.
A. Overview of the RICO Statute
Aware of the magnitude of the problem of organized crime
corruption of businesses and unions alike, in 1970 Congress
enacted RICO,14 which, as one of the Act's sponsors said,
was aimed at "striking a mortal blow against the property
interests of organized crime."15 The recognition that, in
many instances, organized crime had come to dominate large
and powerful unions was prominent among the congressional
concerns underlying RICO:
Closely paralleling its takeover of legitimate businesses,
organized crime has moved into legitimate unions. Con-
trol of labor supply through control of unions ... provides
the opportunity for theft from union funds, extortion
through the threat of economic pressure, and the profit to
be gained from the manipulation of welfare and pension
funds and insurance contracts. Trucking, construction,
14. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901a, 84 Stat.
922, 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
15. 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
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and waterfront entrepreneurs have been persuaded for
labor peace to countenance gambling, loansharking and
pilferage. As the takeover of organized crime cannot be
tolerated in legitimate business, so, too, it cannot be
tolerated here.' 6
The RICO statute represents an economic approach to rooting
out organized crime in businesses and labor unions, not simply
a reorganization of previously established methods of fighting
corruption. As the Supreme Court observed, "the RICO
statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprece-
dented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its
economic roots."'7
The essence of the RICO statute is a prohibition on gaining
control of an economic enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering. The statute provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. 18
The RICO statute defines "racketeering activity" to include a
host of federal and state offenses traditionally associated with
organized crime, including murder, kidnaping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, and dealing in narcotics.
The listed offenses also specifically include certain labor-
related offenses, such as embezzlement from pension and
welfare funds.'9
16. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 78 (footnote omitted).
17. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988). The Act further provides that it is unlawful to
participate in the affairs of an enterprise, or to conspire to acquire control of, or
participate in the affairs of, an enterprise, as part of a pattern of racketeering. Id.
§ 1962(c), (d).
19. In particular, "racketeering activity" includes, inter alia:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any
of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: . . . [S]ection 664
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds) .... section 1341
(relating to mail fraud) .... section 1343 (relating to wire fraud) .... section
RICO and Labor Unions
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RICO contains provisions for both criminal penalties and
civil remedies. 20 The purpose of this two-fold approach was
to attack the corrupting influence that Congress recognized
organized crime had gained over many types of the nation's
commercial enterprises and unions.21 Recognizing that years
of successful prosecutions of organized crime figures had not
weakened organized crime's firm grip over many sectors of the
nation's economy,22 Congress sought to expand greatly the
prosecutorial tools available to the government and the
remedial tools available to the courts.23 Congress explicitly
declared that the provisions of the RICO statute "shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."24
This directive is unique in the entire body of substantive
federal criminal law.25
In section 1964, the civil portion of the RICO statute,
Congress granted federal courts extremely broad powers to
impose equitable relief to prevent and restrain RICO viola-
tions. The statute provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section
1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, in-
cluding, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest
himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enter-
prise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including, but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the
same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce;
1503 (relating to obstruction ofjustice), . . . section 1952 (relating to racketeer-
ing), ... section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments).... [and]
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from Union funds) ....
Id. § 1961(1).
20. See id. § 1963 (criminal penalties); id. § 1964 (civil remedies).
21. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 76-78.
22. See id. at 78-79.
23. See id. at 79-83.
24. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947.
25. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (noting, however, that
there is a similar provision in the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988)).
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or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
26making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
This provision for equitable remedies is perhaps the broadest
of the powers granted to the courts under the RICO statute.27
This broad equitable power comports with the legislative
history of the statute. The final report of the House Judiciary
Committee explained that section 1964 was intended to be a
starting rather than ending point for devising creative
solutions to organized crime problems:
Subsection (a) contains broad provisions to allow for
reform of corrupted organizations. Although certain
remedies are set out, the list is not meant to be exhaustive,
and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the
aim set out of removing the corrupting influence and make
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.28
The Senate Judiciary Committee concurred in this approach,
noting that the equitable provisions of the RICO statute were
intended to be "broad enough to do all that is necessary to free
the channels of commerce from all illicit activity."29 Although
Congress modeled the civil provisions of the RICO statute
after existing antitrust statutes, ° Congress made clear that
previous models were to be sources of inspiration, not limita-
tion, for equitable remedies: "[I]t must be emphasized that
[RICO's enumerated] remedies are not exclusive," and include
but are not limited to "the full panoply of civil remedies ...
now available in the antitrust area."31 Plainly, Congress
intended that federal courts would apply the equitable
remedies of the RICO statute broadly to effectuate the
statute's purpose. As illustrated in the next section, the
government has made extensive use of these broad powers in
an attempt to remedy the problem of corrupted labor unions.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
27. The Supreme Court has expressly held that "if Congress' liberal-construction
mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964 [the civil remedies section], where
RICO's remedial purposes are most evident." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479, 492 n.10 (1985).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1970).
29. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 79.
30. Id. at 81.
31. Id; see also id. at 160 (stating that "the list [of § 1964 remedies] is not
exhaustive").
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B. The Government's Prior Civil RICO Cases
The influence of organized crime within several of the
nation's largest labor unions is frightening in magnitude. For
example, in its 1986 report, the President's Commission on
Organized Crime identified four international unions-the
International Longshoremen's Association, the Hotel and
Restaurant Employees International Union, the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Laborers International
Union of North America-as "substantially influenced and/or
controlled by organized crime."32 Unfortunately, ridding
these labor unions of organized crime domination has proved
to be a difficult task. Thus far, the government has invoked
RICO's civil remedy provisions against unions in only the most
egregious circumstances of corruption by organized crime.33
These cases demanded equitable relief in the interest of
protecting the victims of organized crime-the union member-
ship, affected businesses, and the public at large.
When the federal government has brought civil RICO cases,
it has sought equitable relief in the form of a divestiture or
trusteeship over the affected entities.34 These entities have
included various combinations of individual businesses35 and
labor unions," and in one instance an entire marketplace.37
32. THE EDGE, supra note 6, at xvi (quoting Labor Violence and the Hobbs Act:
Hearings on S. 462 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., ist & 2d
Sess. 208 (1984) (testimony of Floyd I. Clark, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal
Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation)).
33. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708
F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Local 359, 705 F. Supp. 894,
896 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part and remanded in part sub nom. United States v. Local
359, United Seafood Workers, 889 F.2d 1232 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Local
30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (E.D. Pa.
1988), affd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); United
States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411,
1419 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Local 6A, Cement
& Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v.
lanniello, 646 F. Supp. 1289, 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 824 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D.N.J.
1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
35. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text; notes 46-52 and accompanying
text.
36. See infra notes 42-86 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Cappetto,38 the first reported case
involving application of the civil remedies provisions of the
RICO statute, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's order granting the government a prelimi-
nary injunction against defendants who had conducted a
sports wagering business at a billiard parlor in Chicago. 9
The court concluded that preliminary relief was appropriate
given that "[i]t was plainly the intention of Congress in adopt-
ing Section 1964 [of the RICO statute] to provide for injunctive
relief against violations of [the statute] without any require-
ment of a showing of irreparable injury other than that injury
to the public which Congress found to be inherent in the
conduct made unlawful by [the statute]."40 The court further
suggested that divestiture of the owner's interest in the
billiard parlor might be an appropriate permanent remedy, but
deferred consideration of the issue until the conclusion of the
district court proceedings. 4'
More recently, in United States v. Local 560, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,42 the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's order granting equitable relief sought by the
government.43 The appellate court observed that "the power
to appoint a Trustee falls within the broad equitable powers
granted to district courts under Section 1964(a)."" In affirm-
ing the district court's order barring two defendants from all
further contact with Local 560 and replacing the union's entire
executive board with a trustee, the Third Circuit held:
"Clearly, the district court's injunction in the instant case fell
within its broad remedial powers of 'divestiture' and
'reasonable restrictions' provided for under section 1964."4
In United States v. Ianniello,4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court order
appointing a receiver pendente lite to run a restaurant
business corrupted by racketeering activity.47 The court took
this action even though the listed owner of the business,
38. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
39. Id. at 1359.
40. Id. at 1358-59.
41. Id. at 1359.
42. 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
43. Id. at 270.
44. Id. at 296 n.39.
45. Id. at 295.
46. 824 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 205.
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Robert Ianniello, had been acquitted of criminal RICO charges
in connection with restaurant profit skimming, which the
government proved at a criminal RICO trial against other
defendants, including La Cosa Nostra 4' Genovese family
capo49 Matthew lanniello, who was also a defendant in the
civil action.5" In appointing a receiver to run the restaurant
during the pendency of the civil RICO action, the district court
reasoned that because "Robert Ianniello either could not or
would not control an improper diversion of funds which the
criminal jury found had taken place"51 the court needed to
appoint a receiver to prevent racketeering activity at the
restaurant.52
48. The President's Commission on Organized Crime has described La Cosa
Nostra, literally, "This Thing of Ours," PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME,
THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 22 (1986) [hereinafter THE IMPACT], as "the
largest, most extensive, and most influential crime group in this country," id. at 35.
La Cosa Nostra is made up of 24 "families" nationwide, with major concentrations in
Northeastern urban areas. Id. at 36. A family is also referred to as a "borgata." Id.
"Nearly all LA COSA NOSTRA families around the country fall under the authority of
the 'national commission,' established by Salvatore 'Lucky' Luciano in 1931." Id. at
37. The structure of a La Cosa Nostra family typically consists of a "Boss," who is
head of the family, an 'Underboss," who is assistant to the Boss, a "Consiglieri," who
is counselor to the Boss, various "Caporegime," who are supervisors of the family's
day-to-day criminal operations, "Soldiers," or "made m[e]n," who are full-fledged
members of the family, and "Associates," who are non-Italian criminal operatives of
the family. See id. at 39-41.
The existence and structure of La Cosa Nostra and its ruling "National Commis-
sion" has been proved in a series of successful prosecutions of organized crime
figures. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d Cir.) (involving
the prosecution of the bosses of New York's La Cosa Nostra Families, including
defendant Anthony Salerno, Boss of the Genovese family, for criminal RICO offenses
predicated upon acts of labor racketeering, extortion, and murder), cert. denied, 491
U.S. 907, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989); United States v. Cerone, 830 F.2d
938, 941 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that La Cosa Nostra defendants were "members of
organized crime 'groups' in various Midwestern cities" engaging in racketeering
activity in connection with a Teamsters benefit fund), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006
(1988); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 304-06
(D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986)
(involving the Provenzano Group, a subdivision of the Genovese family in New
Jersey); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Appellants
are [Los Angeles family] members of La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization
engaged in a wide range of racketeering activities, including murder, extortion,
gambling, and loansharking.").
49. "Capo," short for "caporegima," is a term used for a La Cosa Nostra member
who runs a group of organized crime members and associates, known as "crews." The
'capo," sometimes referred to as "captain," manages and receives tribute from his
'crew." THE IMPACT, supra note 48, at 40, 44.
50. 824 F.2d at 205.
51. United States v. lanniello, 646 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), af/d, 824
F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987).
52. Id. at 1299-1300.
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991
In United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Work-
ers,53 the government sought the appointment of a trustee to
oversee the operations of the District Council and Local 6A of
the Cement and Concrete Workers Union. 54  The district
court initially ordered a preliminary injunction hearing, which
was to be "limited in time and subject matter"5 in light of
the "very strong showing"56 the government had made at the
outset of the case in support of its motion for preliminary
relief. Shortly after this ruling, the union defendants entered
into a consent judgment appointing a trustee to oversee union
operations for four years, permanently barring individual
officer defendants from holding union office, and, in certain
instances, even from working as union laborers.57 The court-
appointed trustee began his term in April 1987. 5s
In United States v. Local 359,59 the government alleged
that the Genovese family of La Cosa Nostra controlled the
Fulton fish market in lower Manhattan along with the union
that serviced the fish market.6" The government sought an
administrator to oversee the operations of the fish market, a
trustee to run the union, and extensive injunctive relief to bar
Genovese family members and associates from the fish market
and the union.61 United States District Judge Thomas P.
Griesa entered consent judgments appointing an administrator
for the Fulton Fish Market, permanently barring several
organized crime figures from the fish market and the union,
and enjoining racketeering activity there.62 Judge Griesa,
however, refused to appoint a trustee for the union.63
In United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La
Cosa Nostra,64 the government sought a trusteeship for
Teamsters Local 814 in New York City, along with injunctive
53. 663 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
54. Id. at 193.
55. Id. at 197-98.
56. Id. at 197.
57. Judgment (on Consent) Against Union Defendants at 3-7, United States v.
Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, No. 86 Civ. 4819 (S.D.N.Y.) (Mar. 18, 1987).
58. Galen, N.Y.-Based Union Agrees to Less Radical Approach, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 31, 1987, at 1.
59. 705 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part and remanded in part sub nom.
United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 889 F.2d 1232 (2d Cir. 1989).
60. Id. at 896, 899.
61. Id. at 896.
62. Id. at 896, 917.
63. Id. at 917.
64. 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
RICO and Labor Unions
582 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
relief to retrieve the Bonanno family's illegally gotten gains.6 5
United States District Judge I. Leo Glasser of the Eastern
District of New York entered a consent judgment appointing
a trustee for Local 814.66 Judge Glasser also denied the
other defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that the govern-
ment had the right to seek injunctive relief to break up the
Bonanno family and disgorgement of the Bonanno family's
illegal profits. 7
In United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composi-
tion Roofers,6" United States District Judge Louis Bechtle of
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted extensive civil
RICO preliminary relief, including sweeping injunctions and
the appointment of a "court liaison officer" to oversee the
operations of a corrupt local roofers union.6" In appointing
a "court liaison officer" as a preliminary remedy, the court
rejected a mere monitorship as insufficient to prevent union
corruption during the pendency of the action.7" The court
gave the court liaison officer extensive powers over the union's
collective-bargaining process,7' which the government proved
had been corrupted by violence and threats of violence against
employers who refused to comply with the union leadership's
demands.72
The government's most ambitious attempt to use the RICO
statute against organized crime's contamination of labor
unions appears in United States v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters,73 a case in which the government sought to
impose a trusteeship over an entire international union.74
On the eve of trial, the defendants entered into a consent judg-
ment that granted the government an unprecedented breadth
of equitable relief.7" The Teamsters agreed for the first time
to hold direct, rank-and-file, secret ballot elections for all of
65. Id. at 1419.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1441-42.
68. 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
69. Id. at 1171.
70. Id. at 1167-68.
71. Id. at 1172-73.
72. Id. at 1143-50.
73. 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
74. Id. at 1392.
75. See Consent Order, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88
Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y.) (Mar. 14, 1989). For a summary of the Consent Order, see
United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the Teamsters' top officers.76 Moreover, the court appointed
three officers, each with a specific area of responsibility, to
oversee the actions of the union's officials.77 An "independent
administrator" was appointed, 8 with the power to veto all
union contracts (other than collective-bargaining agreements),
executive appointments, and expenditures; to discipline corrupt
union officials; and to impose trusteeships on corrupted union
locals. 79 An "investigations officer" was appointed to act as
a prosecutor within the union." His powers included the
authority to seek a court-ordered trusteeship over any one or
more of the Teamsters locals.8 ' Finally, an "election officer"
was appointed to run the union's elections in 1991 and
1996.82 The independent administrator and investigations of-
ficer will serve until 1992, by which time the union will have
established its own permanent independent review board. 3
The 1991 election was commencing as this Article went to
print.8 4
On June 6, 1989, the government filed a civil complaint in
United States v. Private Sanitation Industry Association.85
The suit charges 64 individual defendants, along with Local
813 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the
Private Sanitation Industry Association, a trade group, with
RICO violations involving the garbage carting industry. The
complaint alleges that the Luchese and Gambino crime
families have controlled the Long Island, New York carting
industry since the 1950s. The suit seeks forced sale of mob-
dominated companies, removal of organized-crime influenced
officers of the Teamster's Local, and a court-appointed trustee
to run the carting trade association. Trial of the action has
not yet commenced. 6
76. Consent Order at 13-16.
77. Id. at 7-13.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 7-10.
80. Id. at 7-8.
81. Id. at 8.
82. Id. at 15-16.
83. Id. at 3, 19; see also United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 931
F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing election process).
84. Lacey, Report XXVIII to All Members of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, INT'L TEAMSTER, Nov. 1991, at 39 (report of Independent Administrator)
(discussing procedures for 1991 elections).
85. See Complaint, United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, No. 89 Civ.
0970 (E.D.N.Y.) (June 6, 1989).
86. For brief descriptions of the complaint and subsequent proceedings, see RICO
Monster Has Defense Shrieking, Manhattan Lawyer, Sept. 26-Oct. 2, 1989, at 1;
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On February 14, 1990, the government filed a complaint in
United States v. Local 1804-1, International Longshoremen's
Association 7 against six local labor unions of the Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and their executive
boards, thirty-two present or former officials of these ILA locals,
twelve individuals who are alleged to be members or associates
of organized crime families, and several employers."8 In this
case, the government seeks to put an entire economic market-
place, the New York and New Jersey Waterfront, under court
supervision. The complaint asks the court to appoint one or
more trustees whose primary responsibilities will be to ensure
free and fair elections of new union officers and to discipline
current officers found guilty of wrongdoing. 9 The complaint
also seeks preliminary relief in the form of injunctions to keep
organized crime elements out of the ILA and its locals, to bar
ILA officers from engaging in any racketeering activity, and to
provide for the immediate appointment of a temporary court
liaison officer to discipline ILA corruption and prevent further
racketeering activity.9" Trial of the action commenced in
April of 1991. 91
In United States v. Local 295, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,92 the federal government sued Teamsters Local
295 and Local 851, along with fourteen individual defendants,
charging that the Gambino and Luchese crime families had
used their control over the unions to control the cargo business
at John F. Kennedy airport in New York City. The suit seeks
the appointment of a trustee to oversee the affairs of the two
unions and to recover ten million dollars gained through
extortion and illegal payoffs.93
Kessler & Mintz, Feds vs. LI Carters: Suit Seeks Sale of Firms U.S. Says Are Mob-
Dominated, Newsday, June 8, 1989, at A3, col. 1 (Nassau ed.).
87. See Complaint, United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
732 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 90 Civ. 0963) (Feb. 14, 1990).
88. See Complaint at 5-28; see also Local 1804-1, 732 F. Supp. at 435.
89. Complaint at 106-07.
90. Complaint at 103-04.
91. See Three Manhattan ILA Locals Agree to Settle Civil Racketeering Suit,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 64, at M-7 (Apr. 3, 1991) (reporting that four of the six
defendant locals had settled before trial).
92. 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (119 Lab. Cas.) 10,756 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1991), affd
in part and vacated in part, No. 90 CV. 0970, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9564, 1991 WL
128563 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 1991).
93. For brief summaries of the suit, see Teamsters Named in Airport Rackets
Suit, L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 1990, at A16, col. 1; JFK Unions Named in FBI Mob
Action, Newsday, Mar. 22, 1990, at 19. In March of 1991, the court granted the
government's motion for partial summary judgment against two of the individual
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In a recent civil RICO suit, United States v. District Council,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, the government seeks to
remove officers of a New York City-based District Council of
the Carpenters Union and to appoint one or more trustees to
discipline District Council officers and conduct free and fair
elections of new officers.94 The suit alleges that despite
several criminal prosecutions, the Genovese La Cosa Nostra
family continues to influence the District Council.95
Finally, in United States v. Local 54, Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union,s" the government
sought to remove the top officers of the local and place the
local under a trusteeship. 97 The complaint alleged that Local
54, located in Atlantic City, New Jersey, has been dominated
by the Bruno/Scarpa crime family for over twenty years.98 In
a settlement reached in April, 1991, all but four officers
agreed to relinquish their union positions. 99 Further, the
agreement established a court-appointed monitorship over the
local. The monitor will oversee the election of new union
officers over an eighteen month period. °°
C. The Government's Approach to Civil RICO Actions
In the civil RICO cases pursued to date, the government has
developed the framework for establishing the basis of a claim
for equitable relief. Essential to this framework is the
establishment of the elements of a RICO violation.
1. The elements of a RICO violation-The gravamen of any
RICO offense is controlling or conducting of the affairs of an
defendants named in the suit. Local 295, 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (119 Lab. Cas.)
10,756, at 28,290.
94. See United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, Press
Release at [4] (Sept. 6, 1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
95. Id. at [3]. For a brief summary of the complaint, see Racketeering Suit
Against Carpenters Chief, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1990, at B1, col. 2. The government
withdrew its motion for preliminary relief after entering into a consent order with the
defendants. See Stipulation and Order at 6, United States v. District Council, United
Bhd. of Carpenters, No. 90 Civ. 5722 (S.D.N.Y.) (Dec. 12, 1990).
96. 18 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 13 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 1990).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-15 (Apr. 15, 1991).
100. Id.
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enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.'0 ' To
obtain RICO relief for a labor union, the government generally
must show that union leaders have joined with members of
organized crime to gain control over the union by various
illegal means and have continued to use their control to
exploit the rights of union members.
10 2
a. The labor union as an "enterprise"-There is little dispute
that a labor union can constitute an "enterprise" for purposes
of RICO. The statute defines enterprises to include "any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."' 3 An enterprise may be either
a legitimate entity or an illegitimate or illicit association.' 4
For purposes of a RICO suit against a labor union, the
enterprise may be a particular union local'0 5 or the interna-
tional union as a whole. 0 6 The union and its leaders typi-
cally are bound together under the terms of their international
and local union constitutions.' v Members of the ruling body
of an international union often hold offices in one or more
locals of the union as well.'0 8 This interlinking binds the
locals and the ruling boards of the union together to form an
"enterprise."
b. Pattern of racketeering activity-The definition of
"racketeering activity" includes any one of numerous criminal
acts punishable under state law or indictable under various
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S.
479, 482-83 (1985).
102. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279,
334-37 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140
(1986).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
104. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
105. See United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855,861 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
921 (1977).
106. See United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388,
1401 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
107. For example, the 1988 constitution of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters provided for the election of officers by a regular convention of delegates
from local unions. See INTERNATIONAL BHD. OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AM., CONST. art. III, § 1 (May 19-23, 1988)
[hereinafter IBT CONST.] (defining convention); id. § 2 (defining basis of representa-
tion); id. art. IV, § 2 (providing for election of officers).
108. For example, during the time that he was eleventh Vice President of the IBT,
Harold Friedman was also President of the Ohio Conference of Teamsters and
President of Local 507 in Cleveland, Ohio. United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1990).
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enumerated provisions of the United States Code. °9 Such
acts are termed "predicate acts" for purposes of the RICO stat-
ute.1"' In the Teamsters case, for instance, the predicate
acts alleged to constitute racketeering activity by La Cosa
Nostra and the union leaders included wire fraud, extortion,
mail fraud, embezzlement of union funds, unlawful benefit
fund payments, obstruction of justice, illegal labor payments,
interstate travel in aid of racketeering, and murder.1 '
The government must prove at least two predicate acts to
satisfy the "pattern" of racketeering activity requirement.1 2
Further, as noted by the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., Inc.,"3 the alleged predicate acts must be
related in some way, and not mere isolated events.' 4 Proof
of a relationship between events may be shown by "their
temporal proximity, or common goals, or similarity of methods,
or repetitions." 5
In the context of control of labor unions by organized crime,
the common thread running through the various predicate acts
committed generally is control and exploitation of the union
(the "enterprise") by organized crime figures for their own
economic gain and the benefit of the corrupt union leaders.
This singular illicit motive is the impetus for all the racketeer-
ing acts committed by the organized crime and union leader-
ship conspiracy.' 6
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
110. The term "predicate act" is a term of art describing the commission of an
individual crime listed in the RICO statute. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989).
111. See, e.g., Complaint at 32-35, United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) (June 28, 1988)
(alleging wire fraud in connection with election of Teamsters President Roy L. Wil-
liams); id. at 35-39 (alleging wire fraud in connection with election of Teamsters
President Jackie Presser); id. at 39-40 (alleging use of force, violence, and fear to
intimidate union membership); id. at 76-77 (alleging fraudulent deprivation-of union
membership's money and property rights).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
113. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
114. Id. at 496 n.14.
115. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1382 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989).
116. Cases accepting this common-motive theory of pattern include Indelicato, in
which the court found that the defendant's participation in three separate assassina-
tions, all aimed at changing the leadership of the Bonanno crime family, fit the RICO
pattern requirement. Id. at 1384. See also Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386,
1392 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989) (holding that the
distribution of thousands of fraudulent mailings concerning the sale of condominium
apartments satisfied the RICO pattern requirement where "[a]ll of the frauds
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2. Proving the RICO elements-In a RICO action against a
union's leadership, the government's goal is to prove the two
principal RICO elements: (1) that organized crime has
acquired and maintained control over the union through a
pattern of racketeering activity, facilitated by the union
leadership; and (2) that members of both organized crime and
the union leadership used their control to conduct the affairs
of the union through a pattern of racketeering activity.
a. Proving acquisition and maintenance of control over the
union enterprise-The government's first burden is to prove
the existence of organized crime and its infiltration into the
union. Much of this work has already been done. Within the
past two decades dozens of members of La Cosa Nostra have
been tried and convicted for their racketeering involvement
with various labor unions. Transcripts and court records from
these trials contain proof of La Cosa Nostra's control over the
leaders of these various unions." 7  In addition, both the
federal and state governments have conducted major investi-
gations and issued extensive reports on the existence of orga-
nized crime. Included in these reports are descriptions of
organized crime influence and control over various labor
unions.1
8
(1) Prior criminal RICO prosecutions-Many of the criminal
prosecutions cited in the introduction to this Article involved
officers of unions." 9 These prosecutions have, in many
cases, established the existence of a corrupt relationship
between La Cosa Nostra and particular unions.120 Testi-
mony and court records from these prosecutions may provide
a civil RICO plaintiff with valuable information linking union
allegedly had the same goal, i.e., inflating the profits to be made by the defendants
in the sale of the ... apartments").
117. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
119. See cases cited supra note 6.
120. For example, Roy Williams, a former General President of the Teamsters,
was convicted along with Joey Lombardo, a prominent Chicago La Cosa Nostra
figure, for conspiracy to commit bribery of a United States Senator. See United
States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985). After hearing the evidence in that case, United States District Judge Prentice
H. Marshall of the Northern District of Illinois remarked: "I am convinced, clearly,
unequivocally and beyond reasonable doubt that a structured organization exists,
that it is broken down geographically and that various cities have their various
bosses. I am convinced that, as the Congress has said, there is a domestic criminal
cartel." THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS, AND LABOR UNIONS APPENDIX 41
(1988); see also Williams, 737 F.2d at 594 (identifying Judge Marshall).
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991
officials with organized crime figures. In the Teamsters case,
for instance, prior criminal trials produced a wealth of
evidence for the government, vividly illustrating connections
between top Teamsters officials and members of La Cosa
Nostra.12'
(2) Government investigative reports-A series of reports
from various government agencies has detailed the existence
of La Cosa Nostra and its influence over labor unions.
Principal among these is the 1986 Report of The President's
Commission on Organized Crime (PCOC).122 Some states,
such as New York, have commissioned their own studies
chronicling organized crime's firm grip on labor.123
These reports can be extremely useful in a RICO action as
proof of the relationship between the particular union and La
Cosa Nostra. In the Teamsters case, for instance, the PCOC
report provided the government with a wealth of evidence of
the IBT's relationship with La Cosa Nostra families through-
out the nation. The PCOC report summarized this evidence:
The leaders of the nation's largest union, the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), have been firmly
under the influence of organized crime since the 1950's.
Although many of the hundreds of IBT locals and joint
councils operating throughout the country are not crimi-
nally infiltrated, organized crime influences at least 38 of
the largest locals and a joint council in Chicago, Cleveland,
New Jersey, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and other
major cities. Former Teamster president Roy L. Williams
told the Commission, "Every big [Teamster] local union...
had some connection with organized crime." These locals
operate in the nation's major business and economic centers
121. See Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for
Preliminary Relief, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp.
1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) (June 28, 1988).
122. See THE EDGE, supra note 6.
123. One recent report, for example, details how organized crime controls the
construction industry through labor racketeering. See NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED
CRIME TASK FORCE, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (1987) [hereinafter OCTF REPORT]. Similar reports from
other state agencies include annual reports from the New York/New Jersey Water-
front Commission, see, e.g., 1986-1987 WATERFRONT COMM'N OF N.Y. HARBOR ANN.
REP. (detailing recent investigations of criminal activity on the New York waterfront),
and the Pennsylvania Crime Commission, see, e.g., 1988 PENNSYLVANIA CRIME
COMM'N REP. 25-26 (detailing investigation of La Cosa Nostra influence over the
Roofer's Union).
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and include the majority of the union's 1.6 million mem-
bers. They are the foundation of organized crime's union-
wide influences.
124
The PCOC report further found that "[flor decades organized
crime has exercised substantial influence over the interna-
tional union, primarily through the office of the presi-
dent."125  In light of the extensive evidence of persistent
corruption within the union, the PCOC concluded that drastic
remedies were required:
At both the international and local levels, the IBT
obviously continues to suffer from the relationship with
organized crime. Indeed, so pervasive has this relation-
ship become that no single remedy is likely to restore even
a measure of true union democracy and independent
leadership to the IBT. Sustained commitment of govern-
mental resources to dislodge organized crime from the IBT
through a combination of criminal prosecutions, civil
action, and administrative proceedings is the only ap-
proach that offers even a modest hope of success in the
long run .... [S]ystematic use of trusteeships by the
courts may be necessary to prevent organized crime from
continuing to do business as usual in the IBT.1
26
(3) Fifth amendment invocations-It is not unusual for a
corrupt union officer to refuse to testify regarding his associa-
tion with organized crime when he is called before a congres-
sional investigating committee, before a grand jury, before
government agencies responsible for union affairs, or at
depositions in civil actions. 127  In such cases, the union
124. THE EDGE, supra note 6, at 89 (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 89. The PCOC identified past IBT General Presidents James Hoffa
(1957-67) and Roy Williams (1981-83) as "indisputably direct instruments of
organized crime" and said of then-current IBT General President Jackie Presser:
"Presser's past activities indicate that he has associated with organized crime figures
and that he benefited from their support in his elevation to the IBT Presidency in
1983." Id. at 90.
126. Id. at 138.
127. See, e.g., Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 600-07 (1962) affirming
the conviction of a labor union president who invoked the fifth amendment and
refused to testify before a Senate Committee investigating union corruption); Curcio
v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 118-19 (1957) (describing a Teamsters official who
invoked the fifth amendment before a federal grand jury); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RACKETEERING IN
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officer's refusal to testify can lead to an adverse inference in
a civil action. In Baxter v. Palmigiano,28 a leading case in
this area, the Supreme Court noted "the prevailing rule that
the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences
against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in
response to probative evidence offered against them."129
Relying on this language from Baxter, the Second Circuit
permitted a negative inference from a fifth amendment
invocation in a civil RICO action.'
30
By invoking the fifth amendment, union officers may also
contravene long-standing AFL-CIO policy, which requires
union officials to cooperate with law enforcement efforts to
fight corruption:
"[V a trade union official decides to invoke the Fifth
Amendment for his personal protection and to avoid
scrutiny by proper legislative committees, law enforcement
agencies or other public bodies into alleged corruption on
his part, he has no right to continue to hold office in his
union. Otherwise, it becomes possible for a union official
who may be guilty of corruption to create the impression
that the trade union sanctions the use of the Fifth Amend-
ment not as a shield against a matter of individual con-
science but as a shield against proper scrutiny into
corrupt influences in the labor movement.'
3'
In addition to supporting a negative inference concerning the
testimony the officer would have given if compelled to testify
truthfully, the officer's invocation of the fifth amendment and
consequent violation of the AFL-CIO policy may constitute a
separate basis for seeking removal of the union official.
13 2
THE UNITED STATES 292-97 (1985) (providing record of hearing before executive
commission's investigation of union corruption in which Jackie Presser, then general
president of the IBT, invoked the fifth amendment and refused to answer questions)
[hereinafter PCOC HEARINGS]; United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
780 F.2d 267, 292 n.30 (3d Cir. 1985) (describing a union official who invoked the
fifth amendment at a deposition).
128. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
129. Id. at 318.
130. See United States v. lanniello, 824 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 1987).
131. Hotel Employees & Restaurant International Union: Hearings Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982) (testimony of committee staff investigator David
Faulkner) (quoting AFL-CIO President George Meaney).
132. The long-standing policy of the AFL-CIO requires labor leaders 'to cooperate
fully with all proper legislative committees, law enforcement agencies and other
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(4) Expert testimony-The use of expert testimony can be
very helpful not only in proving La Cosa Nostra's influence
and control over a union, but also in establishing that the
defendants have extorted the union members' rights. In the
Local 560 case,'33 for example, expert testimony greatly in-
fluenced the court's finding that the union leadership extorted
the membership's rights. Professor Clyde Summers,3 a
renowned specialist in labor law, testified on behalf of the
government and explained his conclusion that "a significant
proportion of Local 560's rank and file were induced by fear of
the Provenzano Group to surrender their membership
rights."35 Summers based his conclusion on the theory that
the atrocious incidents that had occurred throughout the
history of the local should have raised some criticism or
dissention from the membership, but did not. After reciting a
number of incidents that had occurred within the Local, from
murder to appointment of convicted felons to union office,
Summers concluded, "'[I]t is beyond belief that 10,000 mem-
bers would sit by and watch these things done and never utter
a peep', unless a substantial number of the membership were
fearful for their lives or their jobs."'36 The Third Circuit
found Summers's testimony entirely convincing, noting that
"t]here seems to be no other plausible explanation for the
silence of Local 560's membership in the face of repeated
outrageous events." 3 7
b. Proving a pattern of racketeering activity-As stated
earlier, a RICO violation consists of at least two predicate acts
related to each other in some fashion. 38  Extortion, embez-
zlement and murder are examples of egregious crimes that
public bodies seeking fairly and objectively to keep the labor movement or any other
segment of our society free from any and all corrupt influences." AFL-CIO CODES OF
ETHICAL PRACTICES 12 (1957); see also United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile
& Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing AFL-CIO
Code).
133. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985).
134. Professor Summers responded to the presentation of this Article at a March
1990 conference on Union Democracy sponsored by the Association for Union
Democracy and the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Professor
Summers's remarks are reproduced at 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 689 (1991).
135. Local 560, 780 F.2d at 278.
136. Id. (quoting the testimony of Professor Summers).
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
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constitute predicate acts. Other crimes, such as wire fraud,
mail fraud and obstruction of justice, if proven, also constitute
predicate acts for purposes of a RICO action.139  The
government's theories with respect to RICO predicates have,
in some instances, adapted the criminal law to the unique
problem of organized-crime corruption of labor unions.
(1) Wire fraud-Once organized crime elements have gained
influence over a union's leadership, their principal aim (in
addition to extracting money from the union) is to maintain
influence by controlling access to union office. La Cosa Nostra
may take steps to ensure the outcome of elections to sustain
its power over the union. La Cosa Nostra members conspire
among themselves and with the corrupted union leaders to
"fix" the elections.14 ° By doing so, they rob the union mem-
bers of their right to elect their own leaders, and thereby
commit a fraud upon the membership. What on its face
appears to be a democratically chosen leadership is, in truth,
a mob-appointed leadership. This fraud can form the basis for
a violation of the federal wire fraud statute.
The federal wire fraud statute provides generally that a
crime is committed whenever "any scheme or artifice to
defraud" is devised to obtain money or property by means of
"false or fraudulent pretenses" and any communication is
transmitted by "wire, radio, or television" in interstate or
foreign commerce.' The scheme to defraud "need not be
proved by direct evidence; a common scheme or plan may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence."42 The same is true
of intent to defraud, which "is often established by cir-
cumstantial evidence revealing a pattern of conduct or coordi-
nated activities from which a rational person may infer ...
139. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
140. See THE EDGE, supra note 6, at 95-97.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988); cf. id. § 1341 (mail fraud statute). To prove a
violation of the wire or mail fraud statutes, the plaintiff need only establish a scheme
to defraud and the use of interstate commerce in furtherance of that scheme. See,
e.g., United States v. Mueller, 786 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1986) (wire fraud); United
States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986) (mail
fraud).
142. United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981); see also United States v. Wrehe, 628 F.2d 1079, 1083
(8th Cir. 1980) (holding that wire fraud scheme "may be inferred from all the
circumstances of the case"); cf. United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 809 (5th Cir.)
(holding that circumstantial evidence was enough to convict the defendant of
conspiracy to commit arson), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2806 (1991).
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that a defendant joined the scheme or unlawful enterprise with
knowledge of its unlawful objective, i.e., to defraud others."143
For example, in the Teamsters complaint, the government
alleged that certain La Cosa Nostra figures, together with the
sitting members of the IBT's General Executive Board,
selected and promoted Roy Williams and Jackie Presser in
their campaigns for IBT general president. Williams and
Presser were chosen, the complaint alleged, because they were
controlled and influenced by La Cosa Nostra and would be of
economic benefit to the mob once in office. The members of
the General Executive Board endorsed the arrangement
because they benefited from the avoidance of opposition and
accountability to the membership that mob control per-
mits. 14' This arrangement harmed the membership in
numerous ways, such as by reducing wages and other benefits
through sweetheart contracts and non-union labor-leasing
schemes, 45 excessive salaries of union officials, 46 and the
loss of the basic economic right to cast a meaningful union
vote. 1
47
The government's complaint further alleged that all of the
participants in the election fraud schemes concealed from the
IBT membership La Cosa Nostra's control and influence over
the union's electoral process and the IBT leadership.'
Because the General Executive Board owed a fiduciary duty
under federal labor law to protect the interests of the member-
ship over personal or outside interests, 49 this concealment
worked a fraud on the membership.15 ° Further, because the
143. United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added);
see also United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539, 546 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 809 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
144. Complaint at 32-35, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708
F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) (June 28, 1988).
145. Id. at 76-82.
146. Id. at 72.
147. Id. at 67-68.
148. Id. at 32-33 (alleging control of Williams).
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
150. This theory is well accepted. See United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920,
926 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he concealment by a fiduciary of material information which
he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the non-
disclosure could or does result in harm to another is a violation of the [mail fraud]
statute."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); see also Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450,
455 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding mail fraud conviction of government official who had
concealed conflict of interest from public); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024,
1035 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Bronston), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
The fraud, moreover, was not limited to some abstract corruption of the election
process. La Cosa Nostra's objective in controlling Teamsters General Presidents
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defendants had made telephone calls in furtherance of the
election fraud conspiracy,151 they violated the wire fraud
statute.
Unfortunately, many unions use election processes that are
susceptible to La Cosa Nostra control. In the Teamsters
Union, for instance, the membership did not directly elect the
international officers.' 52 Rather, IBT officers were elected at
conventions held every five years,'53 the maximum period
permitted under the Landrum-Griffin Act.'54 Delegates to
the convention were selected almost exclusively from among
local union officers and business agents. '55 Moreover, if the
office of IBT general president became vacant during the five-
year period between conventions, as occurred in 1981 when
Frank Fitzsimmons died in office and in 1983 when Roy
Williams was convicted while in office,' 56 the General Execu-
tive Board selected the new general president,'57 giving him
the crucial advantage of incumbency at the next convention.' 8
Similarly, vacancies in the office of IBT vice-president were
filled by appointment of the General President, with the
approval of a majority of the General Executive Board. 5 9
At the time the government brought its suit against the
Teamsters, it was prepared to prove that thirteen of the
Williams and Presser, as Angelo Lonardo, former Cleveland underboss explained, was
to obtain various "favors," such as local union charters, union positions for themselves
and their associates, and large loans from the Teamsters Central States Pension
Fund. See Deposition of Angelo Lonardo 118-20, United States v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) (Sept. 14, 1988).
151. In his deposition in the case, Angelo Lonardo, former underboss of the
Cleveland organized crime family, testified about the facts surrounding the election
fraud conspiracy and indicated that calls had been placed between various organized
crime and Teamsters figures. See Deposition of Angelo Lonardo, supra note 150, at
96-97, 108-10.
152. The government's claims in the Teamsters case did not involve elections at
the local level. See Complaint at 67, United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y.) (June 28, 1988). As a result of the settlement
of the Teamsters case, substantial changes have been made in the Teamsters election
process and an Elections Officer has been empowered to monitor upcoming elections.
See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
153. See IBT CONST., supra note 107, art. III, § 1.
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 481(a) (1988).
155. See IBT CONST., supra note 107, art. III, § 5.
156. See THE EDGE, supra note 6, at 89-90.
157. See IBT CONST., supra note 107, art. VI, § 8(a).
158. For a discussion of the advantages held by incumbents even in a union free
from corruption, see generally Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspec-
tives from Landrum-Griffin, 43 MD. L. REV. 93 (1984).
159. See IBT CONST., supra note 107, art. VI, § l(a).
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sixteen sitting vice-presidents had first come to their offices
through this appointment procedure, and that the three
remaining vice-presidents ran with the incumbent slate at
conventions at which the IBT's General Executive Board was
expanded to create new vice-presidential slots for them.
Because of the concentration of power in a few hands and the
limited opportunities for democratic review, La Cosa Nostra
gained influence over the top IBT leadership and the officers
of many major local Teamsters unions. This influence, in
turn, allowed La Cosa Nostra to control the Teamsters' elec-
toral process and to install international union officers without
ever subjecting them to a vote by the full membership. 6 °
(2) Extortion of union members' rights-The theory of
extortion in a union trusteeship case involves more than the
simple scenario of a criminal placing a gun to the head of a
union member and demanding his paycheck. This theory
recognizes more subtle and pervasive (though no less effective)
forms of extortion. In unions controlled by organized crime,
extortion typically takes the shape of long-standing, notorious,
and unremedied acts of violence, association of union officers
with known criminals and organized crime figures, and
appointment to union office of persons with extensive criminal
records. This kind of obvious domination of a union by
criminal elements may continue for so long that union
members come to accept corruption of the union as an inevita-
bility. A climate of fear and intimidation arises. Eventually,
the union members give up any hope of exercising their basic
rights to choose their own leaders and to manage their own
affairs.161
By creating, fostering, or tolerating such a situation, union
officers violate the Hobbs Act.'62 The Hobbs Act declares
generally that obstruction of, or interference with, commerce
by means of extortion is a criminal offense.' 63 To prove a
Hobbs Act violation, the government must establish that:
(i) the defendants induced their victims to part with property,
(ii) through the use of fear, (iii) with an adverse effect on
interstate commerce. 64
160. Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary
Relief at 34-35, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) (June 28, 1988).
161. For a concrete example of such a scenario, see supra notes 133-37 and
accompanying text.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
163. Id. § 1951(a).
164. United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 59 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 936 (1972); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) ("[The
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The range of property interests protected under the Hobbs
Act is expansive. As the Second Circuit stated in United
States v. Tropiano:65
The concept of property under the Hobbs Act, as devolved
from its legislative history and numerous decisions, is not
limited to physical or tangible property or things, but in-
cludes, in a broad sense, any valuable right considered as
a source or element of wealth and does not depend upon a
direct benefit being conferred on the person who obtains
the property.
166
Consequently, Hobbs Act prosecutions have focused on the
coercive taking of numerous forms of property, both tangible
and intangible, including union wages,'67 the right to make
business decisions and to solicit business free from coer-
cion,' 8 and other interests.
169
(a) Property rights of the union membership-As a conse-
quence of La Cosa Nostra's infiltration of a union, union
members may be forced to relinquish well-recognized property
rights under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959170 (LMRDA). Section 411 of the LMRDA, for
example, provides that every member of a union shall have
equal rights to nominate and elect candidates and to attend
Hobbs] Act speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the
constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce
by extortion, robbery or physical violence."); United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054,
1061 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The essence of extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act
... is the extraction of property from another through the wrongful use of fear.").
165. 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970).
166. Id. at 1075 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
167. United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 419 (1956).
168. United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1173-74(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 916, and cert. denied, 450 U.S. 985, and cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981);
United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that "the
property extorted was the right ... to make a business decision free from outside
pressure wrongfully imposed"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340,344 (5th Cir.) (holding that
lost business accounts and unrealized profits resulting from forbearance to hire par-
ticular sales representatives was a protected interest), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951
(1973); Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding that
space in bowling alley for coin-operated pool table was a protected interest), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 907 (1968); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 734 (9th Cir. 1963)
(protecting one-half interest in professional boxer), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964);
Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.) (holding that rights under
construction contract were protected), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955).
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
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and participate at meetings.17' Section 411 further provides
that union members may assemble and express their views
about candidates and union affairs.'72 The LMRDA goes on
to provide, in section 501(a), that "[t]he officers, agents, shop
stewards, and other representatives of a [union] occupy posi-
tions of trust in relation to [the] organization and its mem-
bers." ' Section 501(a) declares that these representatives
owe a duty to hold the money and property of the organization
for the benefit of the membership, to refrain from self-dealing,
and to avoid conflicts of interest.
174
The LMRDA thus grants a host of tangible and intangible
rights to union members. Several courts have held that these
rights of union members are protected property rights under
the Hobbs Act. In Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local
95,175 for example, the court expressly stated: "Many courts
have held intangible business rights to be property under the
Hobbs Act. Union rights are no exception. Accordingly, rights
arising under the LMRDA are properly classified as property
rights within the meaning of the Hobbs Act." 76 The Third
Circuit, in United States v. Local 560, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters,77 reached the same conclusion, holding
that the Hobbs Act does not distinguish between tangible and
intangible property, 17 and that "the membership's intangi-
ble property right to democratic participation in the affairs of
their union is properly considered extortable 'property' for
purposes of the Hobbs Act. " 179  Judge Edelstein, in United
171. Id. § 411(a)(1).
172. Id. § 411(a)(2).
173. Id. § 501(a).
174. Id.
175. 627 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
176. Id. at 178-79 (citations omitted).
177. 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
178. Id. at 281.
179. Id. at 282. In the Local 560 case, the Third Circuit relied in part on Dusing
v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term), modified on other
grounds and affd, 263 A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941). In Dusing, the court found
that the rights to union membership are "as real and as needful of equitable
protection, surely, as money or chattels." Id. at 37, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 884. The court
further noted that:
If a member has a "property right" in his position on the roster, I think he has
an equally enforcible [sic] property right in the election of men who will
represent him in dealing with his economic security and collective bargaining
where that right exists by virtue of express contract in the language of a union
constitution.
Id; see also United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding
conviction of union official for extortion of union members and cement company that
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States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,"'° adopted
the Third Circuit's reasoning in Local 560 and held that
intangible rights are property rights and that the
government's complaint, which alleged that the defendants
"created an atmosphere wherein Union members were led to
feel intimidated, threatened, or pressured in the exercise of
their rights to Union democracy," stated a Hobbs Act
claim.181
The notion that a union member's right to participate in
union affairs is inextricably linked with her economic interests
seems intuitively obvious. The motivating force behind
unionization, after all, is purely economic. The court in
Rodonich, for example, rejected the defendant's contentions
that union rights were "any less a 'source of wealth' than ordi-
nary rights to do business.""2 "To the contrary," the court
concluded, "it would appear that LMRDA rights provide many
union members with a source of livelihood."
1 83
The legislative history of the LMRDA further confirms that
LMRDA rights are economic rights. Senator John F. Kennedy,
one of the sponsors of the LMRDA, concurred with another
senator's statement during the course of debate that the
rights enumerated in the Act "are economic rights .... They
arise from economic problems and deal with economic
democracy."184
(b) Creation of a climate of fear-Because the corruption of
a union is often an insidious process, taking place over many
years and through gradual development of ever greater control
by criminal elements, it can be difficult to point to a single
event wherein members were threatened with harm if they
chose to exercise their democratic rights. To prove a Hobbs
Act violation, however, it is not necessary to show that the
membership's fear is a result of a direct threat of immediate
sought to avoid labor problems and stating that 'the corrupt abuse of the power of
a union official in our view is precisely the type of activity which the [Hobbs] Act was
designed to embrace"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978).
180. 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
181. Id. at 1399.
182. 627 F. Supp. at 179 n.2.
183. Id; see also Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435-36 (1982) (stating that the
LMRDA protects "the rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear
of sanctions by the union, which in many instances could mean loss of union member-
ship and in turn loss of livelihood") (emphasis added).
184. 105 CONG. REC. 6485 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1111 (1959).
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harm."8 5 Recognizing that "[flear is not defined or qualified"
in the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act, l8 6 courts,
in searching for evidence of fear in a union's membership,
have examined the entire factual setting.117  For example,
courts have recognized that a defendant need not have
generated fear in his victim to be convicted of extortion; it will
suffice if he exploited his victim's preexisting fear.' Courts
have also upheld Hobbs Act convictions where fear was
instilled or exploited by reference to the defendant's reputation
for violence and organized crime affiliation. In United States
v. Russo,"9 for example, the court permitted the admission
of evidence regarding a defendant's reputation for involvement
with La Cosa Nostra on the ground that his reputation created
a fear of economic loss among members of a Teamsters
local. 9 ° The defendants in that case, including a business
agent of the local, were found to have violated the Hobbs Act
because they "knew of and intentionally made use of" the
members' fear.' 9 ' Similarly, courts have recognized that
simply mentioning the name of a notorious criminal can instill
185. The Second Circuit recently held that "[a] direct threat of future harm is not
necessary to establish the reasonableness of the alleged victim's fear." United States
v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d
320, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that fear need not be consequence of direct or
implicit threat by defendant, but need only be reasonable under circumstances), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983); cf. United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 352 (5th Cir.)
(holding that intent to extort may be inferred from ambiguous statements), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
186. Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
915 (1955).
187. Recognizing that there is no absolute standard by which an extortion is mea-
sured, one court has held that "[i]t is sufficient if the government can show
circumstances surrounding the act of extortion that render the victim's fear reason-
able." United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1328 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1209 (1983); see also Duhon, 565 F.2d at 351 (finding extortion where the
implicit threat exploited the vulnerability, under the circumstances, of the victims).
As the Third Circuit noted, "fear can be invoked in subtle and indirect ways." United
States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 288 n.24 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1572 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524,
529 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 867 (1945).
189. 708 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983).
190. Id. at 214.
191. Id.
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fear,192 and that fear can exist where union members become
aware that defendants are "underworld" or "strong-arm"
men. 193
A textbook example of the creation and use of a climate of
fear and intimidation to extort union members' rights appears
in United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.'94 In that case, the court granted the govern-
ment's request to put IBT Local 560 into trusteeship because
the union had been captured and controlled by the Provenzano
faction of the Genovese organized crime family.'95 The
evidence showed that the Provenzanos and their cohorts
conducted a campaign of violence, murder, and threats of
physical and economic injury against Local 560 members in
order to extinguish all challenges to the Provenzanos' rule.
96
Evidence in the case included proof that, in 1961, Anthony
Provenzano, then President of Local 560 and a Genovese
family capo, recruited two men to kill Anthony Castellitto, a
Local 560 member who opposed Provenzano's union leader-
ship.' 97 Discussing the Castellitto murder, United States
District Judge Harold Ackerman recognized the pervasive
effect that even a single profound violent act can have:
[T]he disappearance [of Castellitto] generated a perception
among the membership that anyone who represented an
actual or potential threat to the Provenzano Group's
dominance and control over Local 560 ran the risk of
physical injury. The nature and intensity of that percep-
tion has been such that it survives to the present
day ....98
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that,
through such violence and intimidation, the Provenzano
192. United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1405 (2d Cir. 1972).
193. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 740 (9th Cir. 1963); see also United
States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1073, 1081 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1021 (1970).
194. 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
195. See id. at 321.
196. See id. at 306-17.
197. See id. at 306-07. Castellitto was murdered on June 6, 1961. Id. at 306.
Anthony Provenzano was later convicted for his part in the Castellitto murder. See
People v. Provenzano, 79 A.D.2d 811, 435 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1980).
198. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 312.
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group had extorted "the membership's rights to democratic
participation in Local 560. "199 Having cowed union mem-
bers into abandoning control over the affairs of their union,
the Provenzano group used IBT Local 560 for its own
purposes-embezzling money, appointing convicted criminals
to union office, and extorting money from employers. 2°° As
for the officers of Local 560, the Third Circuit held that they
had helped create and maintain the climate of fear and
intimidation that "coerced a substantial portion of the mem-
bership into relinquishing their LMRDA rights."2"1 The
court observed that the extortion had been "achieved, not so
much by direct physical assault . . . , but by more sophisti-
cated and indirect physical and economic threats," such as
making certain appointments to office, failing to remove
certain appointees, making certain union expenditures, and
"being recklessly indifferent to the ... systematic misconduct
of fellow incumbent officers."20 2
Testimony from union members who have been threatened
or beaten by mob-connected "goons" can become critical
evidence that a climate of fear exists within a union. Admis-
sions by officers of the union may also bolster this claim.20 3
In a few instances, moreover, former members and associates
of La Cosa Nostra have come forward with testimony concern-
ing their own acts of violence. 20 4  Testimony from union
members concerning their fears and their hesitance in exercis-
ing their rights may also help to establish this claim.20 5
199. Local 560, 780 F.2d at 289.
200. Id. at 278.
201. Id. at 283.
202. Id.
203. The late Jackie Presser, the IBT's former general president, told of his
personal fear of organized crime elements:
"[I]f you're totally honest and if you try to clean up the union like you say I
should, and you try to do it fast enough and without making accommodations
so the government won't get you, the other guys-the hoods-will get you ....
So that's a death chair either way."
S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS 349 (1978) (quoting Presser).
204. Charles Allen, a self-confessed killer and "strong-arm" man who worked for
Teamsters and La Cosa Nostra figures such as Frank Sheeran and Anthony
Provenzano, testified at his deposition in the Teamsters case that the various acts of
violence he committed included "[a]nything from beating somebody up to blowing the
place up to killing somebody." Deposition of Charles Allen at 29, United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ.
4486) (Dec. 22, 1988). His victims included IBT members and officials. Id. at 50.
205. Labor union expert Clyde Summers has testified that union members will
question and oppose pervasive acts of corruption in the union so long as they are not
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Once the civil RICO plaintiff establishes the elements of
property and extortion, the interstate commerce element of a
Hobbs Act violation requires little additional proof.2 °6
(3) Aiding and abetting-Union officers are liable for acts
of extortion whether they participate directly or by aiding and
abetting La Cosa Nostra corruption of the union. Aiding and
abetting liability is predicated on title 18 of the United States
Code, which provides: "Whoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces
or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."2 7
To establish liability for aiding and abetting, the plaintiff
must prove: "(1) commission of [an] underlying crime, (2) by
a person other than the defendant, (3) a voluntary act or
omission by the person charged as an aider or abettor, with
(4) the specific intent that his act or omission bring about the
underlying crime."208
Aiding and abetting liability of union officers can follow both
from their actions, e.g., appointment of known criminals to
union office, and their failures to act, e.g., failure to investi-
gate evidence of corruption. Aiding and abetting liability for
a failure to act flows from a union officer's fiduciary duty to
the union membership. As courts have recognized, when a
union officer has a duty to act, his failure to do so can support
a finding of criminal liability. 20 9 This concept appears prom-
inently in the area of corporate law. For example, in United
intimidated. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp.
279, 316-17 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1140 (1986).
206. The "interstate commerce" element of a Hobbs Act violation can be
established easily. Because the Hobbs Act applies to conduct affecting commerce "in
any way or degree," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988), it is well settled that the "interstate
commerce" element can be established by "proof of a reasonably probable effect on
interstate. commerce, however minimal, as a result of the extortion." United States
v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
909 (1977); see also United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Calder, 641 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981);
United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043
(1980). The activities of most unions affect interstate commerce because unions enter
into collective-bargaining agreements with various businesses directly engaged in
interstate commerce: "Thus, when membership rights to democratic participation in
[a] union [are] extorted, the actions of [the union are] affected, which, in turn, result[]
in affecting interstate commerce through businesses involved in interstate com-
merce." Local 560, 780 F.2d at 281 n.15.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
208. United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091, 1097 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
United States v. Perry, 643 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
209. See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
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States v. Andreadis,21° the court upheld the fraud conviction
of a corporate officer even though he denied knowledge that
advertisements for his product were false.211 The Andreadis
court emphasized that:
[A] person in [the defendant's] shoes should not be able to
insulate himself from liability ... by contending he was
not told that the claims made for his product by his
advertising agency were false, even if the contention
should happen to be true.... [The defendant] had some
affirmative duty to insure that the claims the agency
made ... were true. A person in [the defendant's] shoes,
having failed totally to discharge this responsibility in
even the slightest measure, should not be permitted to
escape the consequences of his inattention.212
Thus, in Andreadis, and in a wide variety of other cases
involving corporations, courts have found the defendant of-
ficers' failure to investigate and rectify criminal activity
sufficient to support the inference that the defendant intended
to bring about the underlying crime.21 '3  As the Andreadis
court argued,21 4 cultivating ignorance will not serve to insu-
late a defendant from liability.2 5
210. 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
211. Id. at 426.
212. Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
213. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
inaction can support aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud where inaction
was "in conscious and reckless violation of a duty to act"); R.H. Johnson & Co. v.
SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.) (finding civil liability where corporation and principal
failed to supervise employee), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); Baird v. Franklin, 141
F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir.) (recognizing potential civil liability where the New York Stock
Exchange failed to discipline member), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
214. This argument was not the actual basis of the court's holding in Andreadis.
Instead, the court held that the prosecution had proved intent based on an inferred
conversation between the defendant and the principal. Andreadis, 366 F.2d at 423.
The court went on to state that the jury could also have inferred intent solely from
the defendant's failure to fulfill his duty to investigate. Id.
215. 366 F.2d at 430. Indeed, the Second Circuit, in affirming the convictions of
defendants charged as principals (not merely as aiders and abettors) in a drug
smuggling case, has recognized that "where knowledge is an essential element,
specific knowledge is not always necessary; rather, purposeful ignorance may suffice."
United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 675 (2d Cir. 1974). In addition, the Supreme
Court has affirmed the conviction of a defendant as a principal who "practice[d] a
studied ignorance." Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 (1970). It has also
stated that defendants may be liable if they were "grossly indifferent to [their] duty
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This theory of aiding and abetting liability plainly extends
to the union context. In a leading case on aiding and abetting
by union officials, United States v. Local 560, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,216 the district court, after empha-
sizing the affirmative statutory duty that union officers owe to
the union membership,217 found that the Teamsters Local
560 Executive Board had aided and abetted multiple acts of
extortion by La Cosa Nostra figures by failing to respond to
clear evidence of criminal activity within the union.2"' In
affirming the district court's decision, the Third Circuit noted
that the district court had properly recognized that "if an
individual fails to act when he has an affirmative duty to do
so, negative inferences concerning his intent can be drawn
from this inaction."2"9 Relying upon the "elevated duty of
care owed to union members by their officers,"22 ° the district
court drew a negative inference based on the demonstrated
unwillingness of the union's executive board to take any action
to remedy pervasive and long-standing corruption.221
Failure to act in the context of demonstrated, pervasive,
long-standing organized crime corruption of a union may thus
amount to more than mere indolence or mismanagement. In
such a setting, failure to remedy or even to investigate union-
related corruption can constitute an active show of support for
organized crime domination of the union. For example, union
officers may allow convicted felons to obtain office and remain
in respect to the ascertainment of [the] fact[s]," Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728,
735 (1899).
216. 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
217. See id. at 335-36 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)).
218. See id.
219. Local 560, 780 F.2d at 284. The Third Circuit emphasized, however, that the
failure to fulfill a duty alone was not enough to support liability for aiding or abetting
a crime; the failure to meet a duty must support an inference of intent. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.; see also Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 335-36. Judge Edelstein expressly
adopted the Local 560 theory of aiding and abetting liability in United States v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In
denying defendants' motions to dismiss the government's civil RICO action against
the Teamsters International Union, Judge Edelstein noted that members of the
Teamsters General Executive Board had a fiduciary duty to "disclose and remedy
wrongdoing by the IBT." Id. at 1401. The court found that the complaint adequately
alleged a breach of that duty because, given the scope of the allegations of corruption,
'only through conscious avoidance could a member of the [General Executive Board]
not have had any knowledge that would have required him to exercise his fiduciary
duty to act." Id.; see also United States v. Snyder, 668 F.2d 686, 690-91 (2d Cir.)
(holding that proof of Teamsters benefit fund officer's breach of fiduciary duty was
relevant to the issue of criminal intent), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
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there. At the time the Teamsters complaint was filed, one
defendant, Teamsters Vice-President Harold Friedman, stood
indicted for his role in arranging a "ghost" employee scheme
involving a Teamsters local. Yet, even after the suit was filed,
Friedman remained in office.222 Such acts clearly contain an
element of affirmative aid to criminal elements.
Also, because most union constitutions grant union officers
the authority to expel corrupt members 23 and to impose
trusteeships on corrupted local unions or other subordinate
bodies,224 courts should draw an adverse inference from the
union leadership's failure to act in the face of a persistent
pattern of illegal conduct affecting the union.
Finally, when union leaders actively support and associate
with known La Cosa Nostra figures, these affirmative acts also
may implicate union leaders in the criminal RICO violations
committed by La Cosa Nostra. For example, the Local 560226
court found "the repeated appointments to union office ... of
known or reputed criminals" to be evidence of extortion of the
222. See United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 612-13
(2d Cir. 1990). The Teamsters General Executive Board had also permitted Maurice
Schurr, an international vice-president named as a defendant in the Teamsters case,
to remain in office for more than three years after his conviction for receipt of illegal
labor payments. See Complaint at 2, 25, United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) (June 28, 1988);
United States v. Schurr, 775 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1985). Also, in United States v. Local
6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), Judge Broderick,
ruling that preliminary relief was appropriate, stated:
I would note again the very strong showing the Government has already made
that criminal domination of the union defendants continues: i.e., the substan-
tial severance payment of more than $200,000 given to Ralph Scopo after his
indictment, together with a Cadillac automobile; and the continued presence,
in positions of union control, of Mr. Scopo's relatives, and of the officers who
were in power in the heyday of Scopo, et al.
Id. at 197.
223. The Teamsters International Constitution, for example, expressly provided
for expulsion of members by the General Executive Board. See IBT CONST., supra
note 107, art. X1X, § 4(a) (describing the jurisdiction of the Board); id. § 9(a)
(providing penalties). The General Executive Board could discipline members and
officers for, inter alia:
(1) Violation of any specific provision of the Constitution, Local Union Bylaws
or rules of order, or failure to perform any of the duties specified thereunder.
(2) Violation of oath of office or of the oath of loyalty to the Local Union and
the International Union.
(3) Embezzlement or conversion of union's funds or property.
See id., art. XIX, § 6(b).
224. See id., art. IV, § 5(a) (granting the general president the power to appoint
trustees).
225. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
226. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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membership's LMRDA rights in violation of the Hobbs
Act.227 Misappropriations of union funds are also extor-
tions of union members' property rights, a violation of the
Hobbs Act, and a RICO predicate offense. Years before the
Local 560 case, the union had voted pay increases to former
union officer Anthony Provenzano, who declined at the time
to accept them. An imprisoned Provenzano later requested
the money-approximately $200,000-for what he called "back
salary due and owing to him."22' The union's executive
board voted to give Provenzano the money. 2 9 The Local 560
court concluded that these payments were evidence that the
union's officers "intentionally aided and abetted" La Cosa
Nostra in the "further extortion of membership rights," thus
violating the Hobbs Act.23 °
(4) Mail fraud-Most unions have some sort of union
newspaper or newsletter that they regularly send to union
members through the mail.231 If in these newsletters union
officers knowingly fail to acknowledge, or misrepresent the
influence of organized crime over the union, a case for mail
fraud may be made. By using a newspaper or newsletter to
assure the membership that organized crime has no influence
over the union, while at the same time facilitating and profiting
from La Cosa Nostra's exploitation of the union, a union
officer may engage in a scheme to defraud the membership.
The federal mail fraud statute provides that whoever devises
a "scheme or artifice to defraud," and for purposes of executing
or attempting to execute the fraud places mail in any post
office, or "knowingly causes to be delivered by mail" any
matter, is guilty of a crime. 2  As courts have held, the mail
fraud statute can be violated where a fiduciary conceals
"material information which he is under a duty to disclose to
another under circumstances where the non-disclosure could
or does result in harm to the other."233 Thus, for example,
227. Id. at 286.
228. Id. at 287 (quoting Provenzano).
229. Id. at 287.
230. Id. at 288. Similarly, in United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete
Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court found that the government had
made a "strong showing" of"criminal domination of the union," by demonstrating that
union officials made substantial severance payments and gave a Cadillac automobile
to an indicted union official. See id. at 197.
231. For example, the IBT publishes its official journal, the International
Teamster, each month. See, e.g., supra note 84.
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
233. United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1981); see also United
States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming a mail fraud conviction
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in Ingber v. Enzor,234 the Second Circuit upheld the mail
fraud conviction of a municipal official who had breached his
fiduciary duty, to the economic detriment of the munici-
pality. 235 The court specifically noted that the municipal
official's concealment of his conflict of interest permitted his
scheme to proceed.236
In precisely the same way, a union officer may conceal his
conflict of interest, i.e., his allegiance to La Cosa Nostra, at
the expense of the union membership, thus permitting his own
schemes to proceed. As the court held in United States v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,23 7 allegations that
organized crime played a role in decisions of the Teamsters
General Executive Board sufficed to state a mail fraud claim
and supported the government's RICO allegations. The court
noted that the alleged mail fraud aided La Cosa Nostra in its
maintenance of control of the enterprise:
Although, as the IBT points out, the acts alleged in this
portion of the complaint presuppose a degree of control of
the enterprise, the concealment would definitely further
the maintenance of such interest or control. There can be
little doubt that a public announcement by the [General
Executive Board] that it was, as the Government alleges,
under the control of organized crime figures would have
dealt a serious blow to the continued maintenance of an
interest in the alleged racketeering enterprise.3 8
where the defendant concealed his misuse of employer's confidential information),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989); United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1009 (5th
Cir. 1987) (restating that the mail fraud statute has been violated where "an
employee violates his duty to disclose to his employer economically material informa-
tion which the 'employee has reason to believe.., would lead a reasonable employer
to change its business conduct'" (quoting United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541
(5th Cir. 1981))), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024, 1035 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v. Rodolitz,
786 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.) (affirming a mail fraud conviction where the defendant con-
cealed personal involvement in repairs from insurer), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826
(1986).
234. 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988).
235. See id. at 453. The court held that the official had breached his duty to the
municipality to have no personal interest in any municipal contracts. Id. at 455-56
(citing N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 801 (providing that a municipal officer may not have
an interest in a municipal contract over which he exercises power of approval or
authorization)).
236. Ingber, 841 F.2d at 455.
237. 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
238. Id. at 1400. The Teamsters court accepted a similar argument supporting the
government's wire fraud allegations in the case. See id. at 1396-97.
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This ruling is consistent with a host of decisions, principally
in the securities investment area, which hold that the mail
fraud statute is violated whenever a defendant uses the mails
to facilitate a scheme to conceal material facts from defrauded
investors.239
c. Evidentiary issues- (1) Admissibility of certain govern-
ment investigative reports-As mentioned earlier, part of the
plaintiffs evidence in a civil RICO action may come from prior
government investigations into allegations of corruption within
a particular union.24 ° One example of such a report is the
1986 report of the PCOC.241
The PCOC was created by a presidential executive order in
1983.242 The executive order directed the PCOC, inter alia,
to "make a full and complete national and region-by-region
analysis of organized crime" and to "develop in-depth informa-
tion on the participants in organized crime networks."243
The PCOC was established as a nonpartisan body composed of
nineteen members with extensive experience in the field of
criminal justice.244 Congress empowered the PCOC to issue
239. For example, in United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983), a mail fraud conviction was upheld where investors were
mailed a status report that lulled them "into a false sense of security." Id. at 311;
see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 451-52 (1986) (noting that the mail
fraud statute is satisfied if the mailings "'were designed to lull the victims into a
false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and
therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had
taken place'" (quoting United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974))); United
States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1962) (reversing a dismissal where a jury
could find that a letter lulling victims into inaction violated the mail fraud statute);
United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding a mail fraud
conviction where mailings "concealed the fraud by maintaining an appearance of
normality"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989); United States v. Wrehe, 628 F.2d
1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1980) (affirming a conviction where a letter lulled the victim into
inaction); United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587, 593 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1016 (1980); United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1354 (5th Cir. 1979) (same),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980); United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 737 (2d Cir.)
(upholding a conviction where mailing served to maintain an appearance of normality
"so as to conceal the actual state of affairs"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975); United
States v. Marando, 504 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (upholding a conviction where confirmation
slips lulled victims into inaction), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974); Zola v. Gordon,
685 F. Supp. 354, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a letter lulling victim into
inaction supported, a mail fraud claim in a private RICO action).
240. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
241. See THE EDGE, supra note 6.
242. See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1983).
243. Id. § 2(a).
244. The members included then-Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr., of New
Jersey, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee; the late Potter Stewart, former
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; and Senator Strom Thurmond of South
610 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
subpoenas for the testimony of witnesses and the production
of documents and to apply, with the assistance of the Depart-
ment of Justice, for orders compelling testimony and granting
immunity.2 45 The PCOC had a staff of more than twenty
lawyers and investigators who conducted hundreds of inter-
views and depositions and reviewed documents and other
information provided by many law enforcement and other
public agencies as well as the private sector.246
In April 1985, the PCOC held three days of public hearings
in Chicago on the subject of organized crime and labor racke-
teering.24  In March 1986, the PCOC released a 393-page
report.248 The report concluded that at least four interna-
tional unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO, the International
Longshoremen's Association, the Hotel Employees and Restau-
rant Employees International Union, the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Laborers International
Union of North America, as well as several independent
unions, such as the International Industrial Production
Employees Union and the International Shield of Labor
Alliances, have been dominated by organized crime.249
A similar report was released in 1987 by the New York
State Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF).2 50  The New
York State Legislature created the OCTF in 1970, with a
mandate to investigate and prosecute multicounty organized
crime activities in the state.2 11 The director of the OCTF,
jointly appointed by the governor and the state attorney
general, 25 2 commands a staff of over twenty investigators,
Carolina, then-Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Honorable Irving
R. Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit served as
the Chairman of the PCOC. THE IMPACT, supra note 48, at ix-xii.
245. See Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-368, §§ 2-4, 98 Stat. 490, 490-91
(1984).
246. See generally THE IMPACT, supra note 48, at 9-18.
247. See PCOC HEARINGS, supra note 127.
248. THE EDGE, supra note 6.
249. Id. at 4. The report concluded generally: "Through its domination of select
labor unions in major metropolitan areas, organized crime at various times has
influenced a number of markets in construction, wholesale and retail meat
processing, trucking, garbage carting, and waterfront trade." Id. at 2-3. The editorial
staff of the New York Times praised the report for its "rich detail" and illustrations
of organized crime domination of these markets. See The Mob Commission Moves on,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1986, at A26, col. 1.
250. See OCTF REPORT, supra note 123.
251. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 70-a(1) (McKinney 1982) (establishing the Task Force);
id. § 70-a(1)(a) (enumerating the duties of the Task Force).
252. See id. § 70-a(2).
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analysts, lawyers, and consultants." 3 Prior to issuing the
1987 report, the OCTF conducted a two-year investigation,254
drawing on its statutory powers to compel testimony, sub-
poena documents, apply for search warrants, and enlist the
assistance of state and local law enforcement agencies. 5
The 1987 Report contains extensive information concerning
organized crime influence over labor unions involved in the
construction industry.256 Other states have produced similar
reports.257
These reports, though not direct evidence of labor racketeer-
ing, should be admissible in court under the exception to the
hearsay rule provided by Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Rule 803(8)(C) provides that public "records and
reports" that set forth "factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law" may
be admitted by civil plaintiffs "unless the sources of informa-
tion or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness."25 The PCOC Report and the OCTF Report meet the
basic requirements for admissibility under Rule 803(8)(C).
Each is a report. Each was generated by a public office or
agency. Each sets forth factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law.
Thus, pursuant to Rule 803(8)(C), these reports are pre-
sumptively admissible. 2 9  The reports must be presumed
admissible, moreover, even if they contain "conclusion[s]" or
"opinion[s]" in addition to their factual findings.26 °
Once it is established that these reports meet the basic
requirements of the Rule, the reports may be excluded only if
253. See OCTF REPORT, supra note 123, at [unnumbered page following title
page].
254. Id. at 1.
255. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 70-a(3), (4), (6), (7) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
256. See OCTF REPORT, supra note 123, at 15-37, 63-87.
257. For example, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission produces an annual report
that details the activities of organized crime members within the state, including
their involvement with particular labor unions. See, e.g., 1988 PENNSYLVANIA CRIME
COMM'N REP.
258. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C). This exception to the hearsay rule also applies to
defendant's use of such records and reports, but it does not apply to use by the
government in criminal cases. Id.
259. See id. advisory committee's note (providing that the rule "assumes admis-
sibility in the first instance").
260. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988) (holding that
evidence "otherwise admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) [is] not inadmissible merely
because [it] state[s] a conclusion or opinion").
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defendants establish that "the sources of information [con-
tained in the reports] or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness."261 The burden rests squarely on the defen-
dants to establish lack of trustworthiness. 262  Further, the
burden is on the defendants to demonstrate that their objec-
tions to trustworthiness, if any, call into question the
admissibility, rather than simply the weight and credibility,
of the reports.263
The Advisory Committee note for Rule 803(8)(C) sets forth
a nonexclusive list of factors that a court may consider in
determining whether a government investigative report is
admissible: (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the
special skill or experience of the investigating officials;
(3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which it was
conducted; and (4) possible problems involved in preparing a
report in anticipation of litigation.264 Courts have indicated
that, in light of this list, and the difficulty of defining precisely
what is and is not "trustworthy," it is within the trial court's
sound discretion to determine whether a report should be
admitted into evidence.265 It appears that all of the factors
cited by the Advisory Committee support the admission of the
PCOC and OCTF Reports.266
261. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
262. See, e.g., Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
805 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986) ("To exclude evidence which technically falls under
803(8)(C) there must be 'an affirmative showing of untrustworthiness, beyond the
obvious fact that the declarant is not in court to testify.'" (quoting Kehm v. Proctor
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983))); Ellis v. International Playtex,
Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that "the burden is on the party
opposing admission to demonstrate that the report is not reliable"); Revlon, Inc. v.
Carson Prods. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 803 F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986);
Doe v. New York Univ., 511 F. Supp. 606, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
263. See, e.g., Bradford Trust, 805 F.2d at 54 ("The weight and credibility
extended to government reports admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule are to be
determined by the trier of fact."); Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir.
1986); Ellis, 745 F.2d at 303 (holding that defendant's "concern about the methodolo-
gy of the studies should have been addressed to the relative weight accorded the
evidence and not its admissibility") (emphasis added).
264. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee
cited, inter alia, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111-15 (1943), where the Court
addressed the problem of a report prepared in anticipation of litigation. Id.
265. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 (1988); Bradford
Trust, 805 F.2d at 54.
266. First, the reports were timely. Indeed, the investigations on which the
reports were based dealt with the ongoing influence of organized crime over labor un-
ions rather than a particular event that occurred at some point in the past.
Moreover, witnesses who testified and who were interviewed recounted their
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In the Local 1804-1 case,267 Judge Leonard B. Sand admit-
ted into evidence excerpts from the PCOC and other govern-
ment reports.268 Judge Sand ruled that all of the Advisory
Committee requirements were satisfied.26 9  Even if these
reports are not admitted for their truth, they may of course, be
admitted to demonstrate that union officers knew, or should
have known, about corruption of their unions.27 °
(2) Admissibility of electronic surveillance evidence-As we
will discuss below, tape recordings and transcripts of conversa-
tions intercepted pursuant to Title III of the Organized Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III) may be discoverable by
a private plaintiff, at least to the extent that those materials
have been used in prior proceedings.271 Once the private
plaintiff has gained access to Title III materials, those
materials may be received as evidence in a subsequent civil
RICO proceeding so long as the communications reflected in
experiences on a broad range of events, for integration with other sources of
information. See, e.g., PCOC HEARINGS, supra note 127. This approach minimizes
the effect of any lack of recall of particular events.
Second, there can be no doubt of the "special skill and experience" of the officials
who investigated the allegations of union-related corruption. These investigators and
attorneys were seasoned law enforcement professionals. Moreover, they employed an
arsenal of investigatory powers, including subpoenas for records and testimony. See
supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (PCOC); 252-55 and accompanying text
(OCTF).
Third, at least in the case of the PCOC, extensive public hearings were held.
Witnesses were permitted to make opening statements. A number of witnesses,
including Jackie Presser, then President of the Teamsters, chose to invoke their fifth
amendment privilege rather than testify. See PCOC HEARINGS, supra note 127, at
292-97 (1985).
Finally, the PCOC and OCTF reports were not prepared with an eye toward
litigation. Rather, each of these bodies was charged to examine the problem of
organized crime in various settings, to report their findings, and to suggest
comprehensive public policy solutions to the problem, including legislation. These
tasks were unrelated to any immediate litigation goal, and instead were aimed at
long-term legislative solutions to a problem. Given these techniques and goals, there
are no better circumstances in which to honor the assumption on which Rule
803(8)(C) is based: "[T]hat public officials perform their duties properly without
motive or interest other than to submit accurate and fair reports." Bradford Trust,
805 F.2d at 54.
267. United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 732 F. Supp 434
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
268. Transcript at 1490-91, United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoreman's
Ass'n, 90 Civ. 0963 (S.D.N.Y.) ( Apr. 29, 1991).
269. Id. (citing Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
270. The reports, to the extent that they are not admitted for their truth, are not
hearsay. " 'Hearsay' is a statement.., offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (emphasis added).
271. See infra notes 404-12 and accompanying text.
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the materials were not intercepted in violation of the stat-
ute. 2 The only grounds for suppression of Title III materi-
als are that the communication was not lawfully intercepted,
that the order authorizing the interception was insufficient on
its face, or that the interception was not made in conformity
with the order authorizing the interception.273
Defendants who wish to challenge previous rulings on the
admissibility of Title III materials must establish that they
have standing to do so, that they are not estopped from doing
so, and that they have valid reasons for relitigating these
issues. Under Title III, only an "aggrieved person" has stand-
ing to move to suppress the contents of communications inter-
cepted pursuant to the statute.274 An "aggrieved person" is
defined as "a person who was a party to any intercepted wire,
oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom
the interception was directed."2 75  A person who was not
party to an intercepted conversation thus lacks standing to
challenge the admissibility of Title III materials.276
Even if a defendant establishes that he has standing to
make a motion to suppress Title III materials, the defendant
must face the fact that the suppression issue was litigated in
a prior criminal case. If the defendant was a party to that
prior criminal proceeding, he may be collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issue. In Allen v. McCurry,277 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court held that a party seeking to bring a
damages action for a civil rights violation arising out of an
272. See County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 369 n.10 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1988) (providing that "no part of the contents
of such communication" may be used in evidence "if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter")).
273. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1988). Suppression under section 2515 is limited to
the grounds contained in section 2518(10)(a). See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413, 432 (1977); Resha v. United States, 767 F.2d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1988).
275. Id. § 2510(11).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 524 F.2d 1100, 1102 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that a defendant who was not a party to intercepted conversations that did not occur
on his premises lacked standing under title 1II); United States v. Bynum, 513 F.2d
533, 534-35 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 452 (1975); United States v.
Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 281 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that because the defendants were
not parties to the calls, they lacked standing), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); cf.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969) (employing the same
standing requirement when electronic surveillance is claimed to violate the fourth
amendment).
277. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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allegedly illegal search would be collaterally estopped by the
denial of his motion to suppress in a prior state court criminal
proceeding against him if he had been given a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his federal claims in the prior proceed-
* 278 thing. As the Court noted, "[u]nder collateral estoppel, once
a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its
judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue
in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the
first case."279
Finally, in the few instances in which a defendant both has
standing and was not a party to a prior criminal proceeding in
which the recorded conversation was admitted into evidence,
he remains obligated to demonstrate why the recorded
conversation should not be admitted in the subsequent civil
RICO action.8 ° In that unlikely event, the plaintiff can rely
upon the ruling of the court that previously admitted the
evidence at least for precedential value. Unless the defen-
dants can establish some basis for suppression that was not
previously litigated, the plaintiff may argue that there is little
point in considering anew arguments made and rejected in
prior criminal proceedings.2"'
D. Withstanding a Motion to Dismiss
Once a civil RICO action is brought against the union
leadership, the defendants most likely will respond with a
motion to dismiss. The defendant may base such a motion on
any of a number of theories. In prior civil RICO actions
involving the government, these theories have included the
following: that the complaint infringes on the defendants'
rights under the. first amendment;282 that civil RICO actions
are preempted by previously enacted federal labor laws;283
and that a complaint has failed to join an indispensable
278. See id. at 103-05.
279. Id. at 94.
280. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
281. For example, in County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), the court declined to pass on the admissibility of wiretap evidence when
that issue had already been litigated in another case. See id. at 366-67.
282. See infra Part I.D.1.
283. See infra Part I.D.2.
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party.284 Civil RICO defendants may also move for a more
definite statement of plaintiffs allegations,2"5 or for dismiss-
al on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to plead fraud
with particularity,28 6 that the statute of limitations has
run,28 7 or that the court lacks jurisdiction.
1. First amendment-A possible, but most likely unsuc-
cessful, basis for a motion to dismiss is that the civil RICO
complaint violates the defendants' first amendment rights of
free speech and association. This theory was rejected by the
court in the Teamsters case as having no merit whatsoever.28 9
The defendants' argument is that RICO liability cannot be
imposed upon union officers for acts of racketeering if those
acts were carried out in part through associations of people
and by speech. A complaint that seeks a trusteeship over a
union, the argument goes, infringes upon the associational,
speech, and assembly rights of the union and its officers, and
seeks to restrain the unfettered exercise of those rights.29 °
This argument does not go very far. The first amendment
does not protect any right to associate or speak in order to
carry out otherwise unlawful activity. As the Supreme Court
stated in United States v. O'Brien,291 "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limita-
tions on First Amendment freedoms."292 The O'Brien Court
expanded on this holding by providing the following test:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
284. See infra Part I.D.3.
285. See infra Part I.D.4.
286. See infra Part I.D.5.
287. See infra Part I.D.6.
288. See infra Part I.D.7.
289. See United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388,
1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("'Freedom of association' is not.., a talisman that will ward
off all government attempts to proscribe or regulate activity. It is only lawful
association that is protected, not association for a criminal or unlawful purpose.").
290. See id. at 1392-93.
291. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
292. Id. at 376.
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restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
293
The Supreme Court since has announced similar holdings in
cases upholding laws that further important government inter-
ests while imposing only incidental burdens on the freedom of
association.294
The use of RICO against the racketeering activity of union
officers satisfies each element of the O'Brien test. First,
Congress had the constitutional power to enact RICO.295
Second, cases brought under the statute further the important
public interest of eradicating and punishing organized crime
and racketeering activity.296
Third, the public interest furthered by RICO is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression. In Trade Waste Manage-
ment Association v. Hughey,297 the defendants raised a
similar first amendment challenge to a New Jersey statute
that disqualified persons who did not "possess a reputation for
good character, honesty and integrity," from participating in
293. Id. at 377.
294. For example, in New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1 (1988), the Court stated:
It may well be that a considerable amount of private or intimate association
occurs in such a [nonprivate club] setting, as is also true in many restaurants
and other places of public accommodation, but that fact alone does not afford
the entity as a whole any constitutional immunity to practice discrimination
when the Government has barred it from doing so.
Id. at 12; see also Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 364-68 (1988)
(rejecting a claim that a statute denying food stamps to certain households with
members on strike violated the first amendment); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 622-29 (1984) (rejecting a claim that first amendment freedom of
association protects the Jaycees from enforcement of a statute outlawing sex
discrimination); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting a claim
that first amendment freedom of association protects a law partnership from the
enforcement of civil rights laws); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Intl,
Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226-27 (1982) (rejecting a claim that a law against secondary
picketing by labor unions violated the first amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982) (holding that only "nonviolent elements of
petitioners' activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment"); Califor-
nia Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972) (holding that
allegations that petitions to government agencies and courts were a sham concealing
a Sherman Act conspiracy stated a claim for relief not barred by the first amend-
ment).
295. See United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd
mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
296. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981).
297. 780 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1985).
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the hazardous and solid waste disposal businesses.2 s8  The
Third Circuit upheld the statute, noting the legitimate public
interest served:
Clearly, disqualification of persons convicted of a crime,
persons charged with a crime and not yet acquitted,
persons having bad reputations for integrity, and persons
who have earned their living by antisocial activity ad-
vances the New Jersey interest in keeping the sensitive
waste disposal business free from the influence of orga-
nized crime. That interest, moreover, considering New
Jersey's history of difficulties in the waste disposal busi-
ness, is compelling. Nor is the exclusion based upon the
state's desire to suppress ideas, excepting perhaps the idea
that crime pays.2 99
Reviewing the question of disqualification based upon bad
reputation, the court wrote, "The state has identified the
waste disposal business as one that is particularly sensitive to
infiltration by organized crime. Its choice to exclude persons
having bad reputations from participating in that industry is
a necessary element of preventing the criminal infiltration
that the licensing scheme is designed to prevent." 00 Simi-
larly, the legislative history of the RICO statute establishes
that organized crime infiltration of labor unions was the prime
concern of Congress in enacting RICO.3 ' Thus, the underly-
ing purpose of RICO is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.
Finally, pleading and proving a case that meets the statutory
elements of a RICO offense imposes liability only for actions
that Congress has outlawed. Any incidental limitation on the
union officers' alleged first amendment rights that may result
from a RICO action is no more than is necessary to further the
important public interest served by eliminating racketeering
298. Id. at 226 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-133(c)). The statute similarly
disqualified persons convicted of certain crimes, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-133(b),
persons against whom criminal charges are pending, id. § 13:1E-133(d), and persons
pursuing economic gain by methods "in violation of the criminal or civil public
policies of this state," id. § 13:1E-133(e); see also Trade Waste Management Ass'n,
780 F.2d at 225-27 (discussing statute)
299. Trade Waste Management Ass'n, 780 F.2d at 238 (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 239.
301. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 79.
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activity.0 2 Put simply, the first amendment does not immu-
nize racketeers from liability merely because they carry out
illegal activity through an "association" or by "speech."
For the same reasons, relief sought against union officers,
such as imposition of a trusteeship over the union, does not
violate the first amendment. The RICO statute expressly
provides for the remedy of barring defendants from contact
with a corrupted enterprise such as a labor organization.3 3
Both civil and criminal RICO cases have employed the remedy
of barring a RICO defendant from further contact with the
union that was the vehicle for his racketeering activity.30 4
302. Although two courts have declined to address the merits of defendants' first
amendment challenges to RICO, see, e.g., United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 1393-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Bonanno
Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1441-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), other courts
have rejected similar first amendment challenges to the applications of similar
statutes, see, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1961) (affirming a
Smith Act conviction of a Communist Party member who possessed the intent to
accomplish the violent overthrow of the government; noting that statute as construed
"does not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with
'the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.'" Id. at 229 (citation
omitted)); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (affirming
an injunction of union picketing that was part of an overall course of conduct which
violated state anti-trade-restraint law: "It rarely has been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject
the contention now.").
303. The court has authority to "impos[e] reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any
person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in." 18
U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988) (emphasis added). RICO's legislative history shows that
Congress wanted organized crime figures barred altogether from labor unions. For
example, the Senate Report stated:
[T]hrough a remedy such as the prohibition of engaging in the same kind of
activity in the future, the criminal element will not only be removed from an
area of activity, they will also be prohibited from using the know-how acquired
to start the same type of business or other organization again under a different
name.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 82.
304. For example, in the Local 560 case, the Third Circuit upheld an injunction
barring two defendants from any future contacts with Teamsters Local 560. See
United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 270, 296 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). In United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975
(5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), affd in relevant part,
591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979), the Fifth Circuit upheld a
RICO forfeiture of all of the defendant's union and union benefit fund offices. 559
F.2d at 992. Through different RICO remedies, defendants in both cases were
separated from the labor organizations which they had exploited through racketeer-
ing activity. Although these cases did not involve first amendment challenges, other
courts have rejected first amendment challenges to injunctive relief under similar
statutes. See, e.g., Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54
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In any event, courts do not consider the terms of a complaint's
demand for relief in deciding a motion to dismiss.
2. Preemption by federal labor laws-Defendants may
attempt to argue that the use of RICO against labor unions is
preempted by the LMRDA 305 or the National Labor Relations
Act 6 (NLRA). Because provisions of both the LMRDA and
NLRA protect union members' rights, the defendants may
argue that the plaintiffs' sole recourse is to those statutes.
The preemption argument,3 7 however, is premised on a
misunderstanding of both the nature of the allegations of
wrongdoing and the scope of relief typically sought in a civil
RICO action involving a union. A civil RICO action is not
brought to invalidate any particular election or to alter any
particular collective-bargaining provision, but to excise the
union's racketeering element. The RICO statute provides the
means by which such relief can be obtained, and indeed, was
specifically enacted for this purpose.
RICO provides a far broader range of equitable remedies
than either the LMRDA or the NLRA and was enacted to
provide a means of ridding unions and other legitimate en-
terprises of organized crime. The Senate Report on the
RICO statute specifically addressed the need to eradicate
organized crime's influence over labor unions in a number
v. Read, 597 F. Supp. 1431, 1446-51 (D.N.J.) (rejecting a claim that the New Jersey
Casino Control Commission's order requiring removal of union officers based on their
associations with organized crime violates first amendment freedom of association),
subsequent opinion, 597 F. Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1984), affd mem., 772 F.2d 895 (3d
Cir. 1985).
In the antitrust context, the Supreme Court often has approved injunctions
involving defendants' labor union and business associations. See, e.g., Los Angeles
Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 98 (1962) (divesting
individual grease peddlers of membership in the union they joined in order to fix
prices); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 427-28 (1945) (ordering
the dissolution of a glassware industry trade association); United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1944) (enjoining corporate officers from
holding office in or controlling more than one movie theater company, with the sole
company specified by the court); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115-20
(1932) (refusing to modify a consent decree that barred chief officers of five meat
packing companies from any participation in a wide variety of food businesses
involving over 100 commodities). RICO's civil provisions are modeled after the
antitrust statutes. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 81, 160.
305. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
306. Id. §§ 141-188.
307. The Supreme Court discussed the test to determine whether one federal
statute preempts another in Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International
Association Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 75-80 (1989).
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of industries. °8 By contrast, the remedial provisions of the
LMRDA and NLRA are not targeted at eliminating organized
crime's infiltration of labor unions and commercial enter-
prises." 9
Although defendants may argue that any fraud that occurs
in a labor context and involves property obtained through
collective bargaining is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board, courts have routinely held
otherwise. 10  As the Supreme Court has observed: "[T]he
federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as
collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal
remedies."311 The legislative history of the NLRA also pro-
vides no support for the preemption argument. The statute
nowhere declares that Congress intended the NLRA to
displace or repeal any state or federal laws relating to fraud
or violence. In fact, its legislative history suggests the
contrary.312 Moreover, for a defendant to assert that the
NLRA has displaced the mail fraud statute (a RICO predi-
cate), for example, is to disregard the holdings of many courts
that have applied the mail fraud statute to various schemes,
even where a comprehensive and detailed federal statute
similarly proscribed the defendants' actions.313
308. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 78.
309. See infra notes 312, 315.
310. In United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 930-33 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1022, and cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983), for example, where the court
rejected the NLRA preemption argument:
We believe that a scheme to defraud employees of these economic benefits
[obtained through collective bargaining], such as wages and seniority rights, lies
squarely within the ambit of the mail fraud statute. The source of such benefits
was the contract between the appellants and the employees. Although they
may have been obtained as a result of employees' exercise of rights guaranteed
by section 7 of the NLRA, these benefits are contractual, not statutory, in nature.
While deprivation of section 7 may be vindicated solely through the procedures
established for unfair labor practice disputes, we believe the broad language of
the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to deprive an individual of economic
benefits that are contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
311. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72,85 (1982) (quoting Connell Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975)).
312. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935) (stating that "the
procedure set up in this bill is not nearly so well suited as is existing law to the
prevention of fraud and violence [by unions or union members]"); see also United
States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055
(1981) ("Nothing in the language or legislative history of federal labor legislation
suggests that federal criminal statutes ... should not ... be available to punish
union members and officials who try to achieve collective bargaining goals by means
of... violence .... ").
313. See, e.g., United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 309-10 (1st Cir.) (noting that
the Commodities Futures Trading Act, which provides at 7 U.S.C. § 2 that the
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Neither does the LMRDA preempt a civil RICO action
against a union and its officers. The LMRDA has never been
an "impliedly exclusive plan of federal regulation for union-
member relations."3 14 Rather, the LMRDA, even upon its
enactment, was intended to be one statute in an arsenal of
statutes directed at remedying labor-union abuses.315 In-
deed, the LMRDA clearly states that the remedies it provides
are not intended to be exclusive.316
As noted above,317 RICO's legislative history reflects the
fact that it was enacted, among other reasons, to prevent the
infiltration of labor unions by organized crime. Statements
in the RICO statute's legislative history concerning the
infiltration and corruption of labor unions were based, in
part, on reports issued by Senator McClellan's committee, the
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field.3" Because these same hearings were
Commodities Futures Trading Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
commodities transactions, does not preclude prosecutions under the mail fraud
statute), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d
595, 599 (7th Cir. 1978) (involving violations of the mail fraud statute and the false
statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001); United States v. Melvin, 544 F.2d 767, 775-76
(5th Cir.) (involving a violation of mail fraud statute and the Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 375-378, which requires the seller of cigarettes in interstate commerce to report
the transaction to state tax officials), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977) ; United States
v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1975) (involving violations of the mail fraud
statute and the Jenkins Act); United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 459 F. Supp. 146
(E.D. Ill. 1978) (involving violations of the mail fraud statute and the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1), affd, 612 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 920 (1980).
314. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337, 1372 (1972);
see also Boffa, 688 F.2d at 931 (quoting Cox).
315. This fact appears in the congressional declaration of findings, purposes, and
policy that prefaces the text of the LMRDA:
The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and
management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of
trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other
failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which
require further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary pro-
tection of the rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they
relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consul-
tants, and their officers and representatives.
29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
316. "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall limit the rights and remedies of
any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any
other court or other tribunal . . . ." Id. § 413.
317. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
318. See S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. REP. No. 621, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); see also United
States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 550 F. Supp. 511, 524-25 (D.N.J. 1982)
(noting the connection between RICO's legislative history and these reports), affd,
780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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the genesis for the LMRDA, it is apparent that RICO-enacted
over a decade after the passage of the LMRDA and over three
decades after the NLRA's enactment-was designed to
supplement the protections already afforded union mem-
bers." 9 Thus, not surprisingly, courts that have faced this
preemption issue have uniformly rejected the argument.
3. Failure to join indispensable parties-Depending on the
identity of the defendants named in a civil RICO complaint,
the defendants may argue that, because the complaint seeks
factual determinations and relief that allegedly would
adversely affect the rights of various union affiliates or benefit
funds that are not named as defendants in the action, all such
entities must be joined as indispensable parties. 321  This
argument proceeds from the terms of Rule 19(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide:
A person ... shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest.
3 22
This argument fails both because affiliates not named as
defendants in the action may not have a sufficiently tangible
"interest in the subject of the action" and because, even if they
319. See Local 560, 550 F. Supp. at 525.
320. In Local 560, the Third Circuit rejected the preemption and exclusivity
argument raised by the defendants with the terse observation that "[t]his argument
has little merit." 780 F.2d at 280 n.13. The district court in the Teamsters case,
when faced with this same preemption argument, observed, "[T]he alleged depriva-
tion of union rights are symptoms; the complaint in this case alleges a widespread
disease in the Union. The labor statutes are designed to treat these symptoms.
RICO was enacted by Congress specifically to cure the disease." United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
321. In the Teamsters case, for example, the Teamsters International Union
argued that all of the local unions and subordinate entities affiliated with the
International Union should be named as indispensable parties. See International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. at 1403-04 (rejecting the claim).
322. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
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have such an interest, that interest is adequately protected by
the participation of the other union defendants.
A factual prerequisite to finding that a person is an indis-
pensable party is a finding that the absent person has an
"interest in the subject of the action" within the meaning of
Rule 19(a). That determination is discretionary, and turns
upon the facts of each case.323 Union affiliates for which the
plaintiff does not request any immediate relief lack any
concrete interest in the action. Although the defendant union
may argue that its affiliates or benefit funds could be found by
adjudication to be controlled by La Cosa Nostra, and that such
a determination could become the basis for further legal action
against it as to which some form of preclusive effect might be
claimed, speculation that an event may occur does not render
a person potentially affected by that event necessary or indis-
pensable to a lawsuit. 2 4 So long as the relief the plaintiff
requests would not alter the membership or hiring practices
of the nondefendant union affiliates, and would not implicate
the rights of the affiliates under collective-bargaining agree-
ments, it is appropriate to characterize the relief requested as
running solely against the named defendant union. Thus, the
nondefendant union affiliates have no cognizable interest in
the litigation.
In any event, because a civil RICO action involving a union
typically will name a union entity and its president and other
officers, and because those officers are entrusted with the
preeminent role in advocating the interests of the union and
in overseeing its affairs, the participation of the union officers
as defendants more than adequately protects the interests of
the union affiliates. For example, the concentration of power
in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' General
Executive Board led many courts to reject arguments ad-
vanced by the IBT that its affiliates were indispensable
parties to public rights litigation. In a series of Title VII suits
323. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
118-19 & n.14 (1968); Prescription Plan Serv. Corp. v. Franco, 552 F.2d 493, 496-97
(2d Cir. 1977); Kamhi v. Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 1975); Freeman v.
Marine Midland Bank-New York, 419 F. Supp. 440, 450-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1976);
Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005, 1022-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
324. See Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1045-46(9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc.,
635 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (4th Cir. 1980); FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami
Branch Office, 357 F. Supp. 347, 353-54 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 515
F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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brought by the government in the 1970s challenging the
discriminatory application of seniority provisions of collective-
bargaining agreements negotiated by the IBT, the IBT
repeatedly argued that its affiliates, which had adopted those
provisions, were indispensable parties. The courts unani-
mously rejected these arguments on the ground that the
presence of the IBT as a defendant adequately protected the
interests of its affiliates." 5
Moreover, the interests of the nondefendant union affiliates
in governing themselves and conducting their own affairs will
coincide with the interests of the defendant union officers in
retaining the fullest extent of their powers. Accordingly, the
union officers may be expected to represent fully and vigor-
ously protect the interest of the union affiliates at all stages
of the litigation and to urge that only the narrowest possible
relief be imposed.326
4. Motion for a more definite statement-Defendants may
move, in the alternative to their motions to dismiss, for more
definite statements under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, claiming that they are unable to frame a
responsive pleading because the allegations in the complaint
lack definiteness. These motions, which are in essence
addressed to the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint,
can be resisted as well.327
Rule 12(e) provides that a motion for a more definite
statement is proper only "[i]f a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party
cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive plead-
ing."32' Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure employ
325. See, e.g., United States v. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc., 564 F.2d 179,
186 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 525 F.2d 1318, 1321-
22 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. T.I.M.E. - D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 310-11 (5th
Cir. 1975), vacated sub noma. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977).
326. Cf. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that where the New York Attorney General's position was advocated by
other parties, he was not an indispensable party), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S.
678 (1982); Prescription Plan Serv. Corp. v. Franco, 552 F.2d at 497 (holding that
trustees dropped from the case were not indispensable because their interests
coincided with the interests of those trustees that remained in the case).
327. "Whether to grant a motion for a more definite statement is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court." 5A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1377, at 600-01 (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (collecting
cases).
328. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
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the concept of notice pleading, courts generally disfavor
motions for a more definite statement.329  Moreover, given
the liberal pleading standards and the availability of liberal
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the use
of motions for a more definite statement has been substan-
tially restricted.33 °
In addition, Rule 12(e) cannot be invoked to "usurp the
ordinary channels of pre-trial discovery." 33' Nor is it the
function of a Rule 12(e) motion to "discover evidence."332
Twenty years ago, "[e]xtensive discovery, rather than elabo-
rate framing of issues through pleadings, [was] becoming the
accepted method of preparing a trial."333  Today, the com-
plaint in a civil RICO action will satisfy the requirements of
the Rule so long as the complaint alleges racketeering acts
with particularity sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. If
the defendants seek further specificity with respect to the
329. See, e.g., Delta Educ., Inc. v. Langlois, 719 F. Supp. 42, 50-51 (D.N.H. 1989);
Cox v. Maine Maritime Academy, 122 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D. Me. 1988); Wheeler v.
United States Postal Serv., 120 F.R.D. 487, 488 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Choat v. Rome
Indus., 480 F. Supp. 387, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Bazal v. Belford Trucking Co., 442 F.
Supp. 1089, 1101-02 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 76 F.R.D.
83, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
The proper motion to challenge purported vagueness in pleading is generally a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
If the movant believes his opponent's pleading does not state a claim for relief,
the proper course is a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) even if the pleading is vague
or ambiguous. Moreover, even if the pleading is so sketchy that it cannot be
construed to show a right to relief, the proper attack is by a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(e).
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 327, § 1376, at 576. Rule 12(e) does not command
'elaborate detail" in pleading. 2A J. MOORE & J. LuCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
12.18[1], at 12-139 (2d ed. 1990) (collecting cases). Rule 12(e) is designed "to strike
at unintelligibility in a pleading, not just a claimed lack of detail." Stanton v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 388 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying
Rule 12(e) motion); see also Cox, 122 F.R.D. at 116. "The Rule concerns defects in the
complaint, which must be only specific enough to apprise defendant of the substance
of a claim so that he may adequately draft a responsive pleading." FRA S.p.A. v.
Surg-O-Flex of America, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 418, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
330. As Professors Wright and Miller state:
[Tihe class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule
12(e) is quite small-the pleading must be sufficiently intelligible for the court
to be able to make out one or more potentially viable legal theories on which the
claimant might proceed, but it must be so vague or ambiguous that the
opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith or
without prejudice to himself.
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 327, § 1376, at 577-78.
331. FRA S.p.A., 415 F. Supp. at 427.
332. Nixa v. Hayes, 55 F.R.D. 40, 41 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
333. Fastener Corp. v. Spotnails, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 974, 977 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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complaint's allegations, it is the discovery process and not a
Rule 12(e) motion that is their proper remedy. 334  If the
complaint is sufficiently detailed to permit defendants to
frame a responsive pleading, the motion should be denied.
5. Failure to plead fraud with particularity-Generally, on
a motion to dismiss, a court must assume that the facts
alleged in the complaint are true.335 Moreover, a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."
336
Defendants may claim, however, that Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that allega-
tions of fraud be plead with "particularity,"337 requires a
higher level of detail in a civil RICO complaint. But that
claim must be limited to the portions of the complaint that
incorporate specific allegations of fraud. Rule 9(b) should not
be applied simply because the complaint is a RICO com-
plaint. 8 Moreover, as courts have noted:
334. See, e.g., Delta Educ., Inc. v. Langlois, 719 F. Supp. 42, 51 (D.N.H. 1989)
(holding that the failure to distinguish defendants who were alleged to have acted
together does not justify a more definite statement); Ford v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
700 F. Supp. 1121, 1126 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (finding a RICO complaint stating that
defendants conspired to extort things of value in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962
sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(e) motion); Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores,
Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that a party requesting the exact
dates of alleged misconduct should obtain the information through the discovery
process and not a Rule 12(e) motion).
335. See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1986).
336. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted); see also
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1065 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Conley). "It is
elementary that, on a motion to dismiss, a complaint must be read as a whole,
drawing all inferences favorable to the pleader." Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition
Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1985).
337. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
338. Recent authority for this proposition appears in Hecht v. Commerce Clearing
House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 26 n.4 (2d Cir. 1990). Although, prior to Hecht, several
courts had indicated that greater particularity might be required in non-fraud RICO
pleadings, see, e.g., Plount v. American Home Assurance Co., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 204,
206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 92, 97 (D.
Or. 1985), those cases themselves involved allegations of fraud, see Plount, 668 F.
Supp. at 207; Schnitzer, 633 F. Supp. at 96. Thus, in United States v. Bonanno
Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1426-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), the court
undertook a thorough review of the relevant case law and concluded that Rule 9(b)
did not apply to RICO allegations of acts other than fraud:
The Court finds no basis for extending the reach of rule 9(b) to all RICO
cases: "Since the rule is a special pleading requirement and contrary to the
general approach of simplified pleading adopted by the federal rules, its scope
of application should be construed narrowly and not extended to other legal
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"The requirement of particularity does not abrogate Rule
8, and it should be harmonized with the general directives
... of Rule 8 that the pleadings should contain a 'short
and plain' statement of the claim or defense and [that]
each averment should be 'simple, concise and direct.' Rule
9(b) does not require nor make legitimate the pleading of
detailed evidentiary matter."
339
Rule 9(b) thus requires only "that the defendants be given
enough information to allow them to frame a responsive
pleading and that the court be assured that an adequate basis
exists for the charges made."3 4° This is essentially the same
standard as applies to a motion for a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e). 341 The arguments presented in opposition
to that motion also apply to a motion under Rule 9(b).
Further, in preparation for filing a civil RICO action, a
plaintiff ordinarily would prepare a motion for preliminary
injunctive relief. The materials presented in that motion
(such as copies of criminal indictments and judgments in prior
cases, prior sworn testimony, and prior government investiga-
tive reports) may further flesh out the basis for the plaintiff's
claims of fraud. The nonfraud allegations of the complaint,
such as simple extortions or thefts of union funds, of course,
should also be emphasized.
6. Statute of limitations and laches-Patterns of corruption
within a union may take years to develop and years more to
theories or defenses." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE § 1297 at 405 (1969); see id. § 1221 at 149 (Rule 9 is the only special
pleading provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The Court is not
persuaded that the fact that a RICO defendant may be labelled a "racketeer"
calls for judicial extension of Rule 9(b)'s scope. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 492, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3283, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) ("As
for stigma, a civil RICO proceeding leaves no greater stain than do a number
of other civil proceedings"); Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 627
F. Supp. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (questioning propriety of altering RICO's
pleading burden). The Court therefore will not scrutinize the non-fraud RICO
allegations of the Amended Complaint against a heightened particularity
standard.
Id. at 1427-28.
339. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 545, 557 n.20 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting
2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 9 9.03, at 1929-30), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
Accord DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir.
1987) ("Rule 9(b) must be read together ... with Rule 8(a) . . ").
340. Rich-Taubman Assocs. v. Stamford Restaurant Operating Co., Inc., 587 F.
Supp. 875, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
341. See supra notes 328-34 and accompanying text.
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uncover. As a result, the allegations of a plaintiff's civil RICO
complaint may, in many instances, involve some events that
are several years, if not decades, old. The defendants in a civil
RICO action are likely to challenge a complaint containing
such allegations on grounds of laches or a statute of limita-
tions. Such a challenge should not be successful.
Although the Supreme Court recently held, in Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,342 that a
four-year statute of limitations applies to private civil RICO
actions seeking treble damages,343 the Court's ruling is
limited to the context of private actions for damages, not
equitable relief.3 44 A civil RICO action against a union
defendant will typically seek purely equitable relief, such as
reform of the union's election rules or appointment of an
independent officer to investigate allegations of union-related
corruption. Because the complaint seeks equitable relief, the
only limitations period should be that imposed by the equita-
ble doctrine of laches. 345 Thus, in Malley-Duff, the Supreme
Court explained that an early version of RICO contained no
limitations period because the "bill included no private treble-
damages remedy, and thus obviously had no need for a
limitations period."346
In civil RICO actions brought by the government, the
doctrine of laches simply cannot be applied. 347  A similar
342. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
343. Id. at 156. The Court reasoned that the four-year limitations period
applicable to private actions under the Clayton Act should also apply to civil RICO
suits because RICO was modeled after the Clayton Act and the treble damages provi-
sions of both statutes were intended to provide an incentive for "'private attorneys
general'" who are injured in their "'business or property by reason of a violation."
Id. at 151.
344. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 1402
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying the union defendants' motion to dismiss the government's
civil RICO claims on various timeliness grounds). Indeed, courts have not applied
statute of limitations restrictions to government antitrust actions seeking equitable
relief. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)
(permitting an action seeking equitable relief as to 1959 merger brought by the
government in 1967 under the Clayton Act).
345. See Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940); Argus, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 552 F. Supp. 589, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
346. 483 U.S. at 155.
347. See United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411,
1458 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Courts have held as a general matter that the defense of
laches is not available against the United States. See, e.g., United States v.
Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940); United States v. RePass, 688 F.2d 154, 158 (2d
Cir. 1982); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938).
Congress expressly acknowledged that neither a statute of limitations nor the
629
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rule should apply to private civil RICO actions. In private
actions, as in government actions, the goal is to vindicate
important public interests. A long line of authority holds that
a statute of limitations or laches defense may not apply in
suits aimed at vindicating and enforcing public rights.348
This authority, developed principally in the context of govern-
ment public interest actions, should apply to a private
litigant's efforts to vindicate similar interests.
7. Personal jurisdiction and venue-In cases involving
multistate union operations, such as cases at the international
union level, questions of personal jurisdiction and venue may
arise. The RICO statute, however, provides for nationwide
service of process, and establishes liberal rules regarding
venue.
a. Personal jurisdiction-Courts repeatedly have upheld
against due process challenge the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over defendants served pursuant to federal, statutory
nationwide service so long as those defendants have "mini-
mum contacts" with the United States. All of the officers of a
labor union based in the United States will have such con-
tacts. Accordingly, under the nationwide service of process
provisions of the RICO statute, personal jurisdiction exists.
The RICO statute expressly provides in section 1965(d) for
nationwide service of process: "All other process in any action
or proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person
in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found,
has an agent, or transacts his affairs."349 Every court that
has considered section 1965(d) has interpreted that provision
to establish unconditional nationwide service in RICO
actions.35 °
doctrine of laches limits civil actions brought by the government under RICO: "[I]t
should be noted that there is no general statute of limitations applicable to civil suits
brought by the United States to enforce public policy, nor is the doctrine of laches
applicable." SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 160.
348. See Dole v. Local 427, Int'l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 894 F.2d
607, 610 (3d Cir. 1990) (summarizing cases). Indeed, the Local 427 court observed
that recent cases have expanded the "public purpose" doctrine to include actions to
protect individual rights as well as public rights. Id. at 613.
349. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (1988).
350. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp.
1040, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Hirt v. UM Leasing Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1066, 1069
(D. Neb. 1985); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1458
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir 1987); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp.
436, 438, 443 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Medical Emergency Serv. Assocs. v. Duplis, 558 F.
Supp. 1312, 1314 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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Where personal jurisdiction is authorized by a statutory
nationwide service of process provision and a federal statute
supplies subject matter jurisdiction, courts have held that it
is fair to require a United States resident to appear in any
federal judicial district as long as service of process provides
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.3"'
Unless an evidentiary hearing is held, jurisdictional facts set
forth in the plaintiffs complaint must be "construed in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, and where doubts exist, they
are [to be] resolved in the plaintiffs favor."352 Moreover,
prior to trial in a case, the plaintiff need only set forth a prima
facie case of personal jurisdiction.5 3
Personal jurisdiction has both a statutory and a constitu-
tional component. 54 The statutory basis for personal juris-
diction must be either a state "long-arm" statute or a federal
service of process statute. 5  If state law provides the
statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, "minimum contacts"
analysis under the fourteenth amendment controls the consti-
tutional question; if federal law furnishes the jurisdictional
basis, the fifth amendment applies. 356 Thus, in a civil action
under the federal RICO statute, personal jurisdiction analysis
under the federal statute proceeds without reference to the
fourteenth amendment's limitations on state long-arm
statutes. Courts generally interpret article III of the United
States Constitution as establishing that "[s]ubject only to the
regulation of Congress, each federal court exercises the
351. See, e.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
personal jurisdiction is proper if "the service authorized by statute [is] reasonably
calculated to inform the defendant of the pendency of the proceedings in order that
he may take advantage of the opportunity to be heard in his defense" (citing Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 245 (1958), and Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950)); see also Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 826 (6th
Cir. 1981) (citing Mariash), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
352. Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
353. See, e.g., Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1983).
"[Aind this remains true notwithstanding a controverting presentation by the moving
party." Hoffritz for Cutlery, 763 F.2d at 57 (citing Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v.
Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also Rolls-Royce Motors, 657 F. Supp.
at 1043 (same).
354. See, e.g., Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer Corp., 762 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 401 (5th
Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982).
355. See Terry, 658 F.2d at 401.
356. See Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Johnson
Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1984).
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'judicial Power of the United States,' not a judicial power
constitutionally limited by the boundaries of a particular
district."
357
The civil RICO plaintiff may further support the applica-
bility of nationwide service of process by pointing out that a
labor union typically affects commerce on a national scale.
For example, in the Teamsters case, the government alleged
that the IBT had a membership of nearly 1.7 million, located
throughout the country,358 that violations of rights protected
by federal statute had nationwide repercussions, 359 and that
much of the criminal activity involving La Cosa Nostra's
illegitimate control and abuse of the IBT originated from New
York City.360  Under these circumstances, the district court
concluded that it was fair for the defendants to be called to
task in the Southern District of New York.361
b. Venue-Alternatively, defendants may assert that their
contacts with the forum are so limited that it would be
appropriate for the court to transfer the case to a more
appropriate venue. The problem of venue, however, is
expressly addressed by the RICO statute, which embodies a
very liberal approach.
First, section 1965(a) of the RICO statute provides for venue
in any district in which the defendants are found or transact
business.362 An entity is "found" in a district within the
meaning of section 1965(a) if it is "present in the district by its
officers and agents carrying on [its] business."36 3 A person
357. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981) (footnote
omitted). Accord Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671-72 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1985); Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at
950.
358. See Complaint at 3, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708
F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) (June 28, 1988).
359. Id. at 30, 85, 86, 102.
360. Id. passim.
361. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 1403
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that nationwide service of process "meet[s] the requirements
of due process"), affd, 905 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (conduct and foreseeable consequences in forum
justifies jurisdictional exercise); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980) (same).
362. RICO's general venue provision states that "[a]ny civil action or proceeding
under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the
United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent,
or transacts his affairs." 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1988).
363. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1133
(D. Mass. 1982).
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who is "regularly conducting business of a substantial and
continuous character within [the] district" transacts affairs in
the district within the meaning of section 1965(a). 364 Typi-
cally, the civil RICO plaintiff will choose to bring the suit in
a district where the headquarters of the union are located;
thus, this venue provision will be satisfied.
Once venue is established for one of the defendants in a civil
RICO action under section 1965(a), a court has great power
under section 1965(b) to consolidate and manage the action in
a single district. That provision states that in any civil RICO
action "in which it is shown that the ends of justice require
that other parties residing in any other district be brought
before the court, the court may cause such parties to be
summoned."365 This section, which has been described as an
"alternative venue provision,"366  authorizes a court to
summon a nonresident defendant into the district "if the
plaintiff demonstrates that the 'ends of justice' so require and
that the action is properly venued under Section 1965(a) as to
at least one defendant already in the suit."3 67  Indeed, sec-
tion 1965(b) may be used to bring nonresident defendants into
an action even in cases where venue could be properly laid
against all defendants in another district.368 The powerful
venue provision in section 1965(b) thus overrides the tradi-
tional notion that an individual's privilege to invoke venue
restrictions trumps other considerations that may warrant
locating a complex, multidefendant case in a particular
forum.36 9
As with the question of personal jurisdiction, the civil RICO
plaintiff may further bolster claims concerning venue by
364. Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1058
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
365. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1988).
366. Rolls-Royce Motors, 657 F. Supp. at 1058 n.13.
367. Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1459
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd on other grounds, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
368. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1290-91 (E.D. Wis.
1985). But see Rolls-Royce Motors, 657 F. Supp. at 1058 n.13 (noting that "the fact
that both [defendants] can be sued in another district ... suggests that 'ends of
justice' may not require an order ... under § 1965(b)").
369. Compare Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979)
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) protects defendants against plaintiffs selection of
inconvenient venue) with Miller Brewing Co., 616 F. Supp. at 1290-91 (finding that
18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) "ends of justice" provision authorizes the court to summon
nonresident defendants even though venue would exist under § 1965(a) as to all
defendants in another district).
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pointing to events and evidence that are connected to the
forum. In the Teamsters case, for example, Judge Edelstein
denied a motion to transfer venue from the Southern District
of New York to Washington, D.C., on the grounds that "the
majority of the named defendants do not reside in Washing-
ton," and that many of the acts alleged in the complaint
"occurred in the Southern District and the tri-state area."370
Second, venue may be proper under the general venue
statute.371 That provision authorizes venue "in the judicial
district ... in which the claim arose."372  Courts generally
apply a flexible "weight of the contacts" test to determine
where a claim arises.373 Under this test, venue properly lies
in the district where the alleged injury occurred or where an
"overt act pursuant to the conspiratorial meetings took place
in [the] district and it was [a] significant and substantial
element of the offense."3 74 Application of the "weight of the
contacts" test will therefore depend on the plaintiffs ability to
point to events alleged in the complaint that have some
connection with the forum. The fact that some events alleged
in the complaint might suffice to establish venue in another
district, of course, will not alone deny venue in the plaintiffs
chosen forum.375 Once it is established that venue lies
370. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 1404
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
371. Courts have held that 18 U.S.C § 1965 is not an exclusive venue provision
but instead operates to supplement the general venue statute. See Rolls-Royce
Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Eaby
v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 n.6 (D. Mass. 1982); Farmers Bank
v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D. Del. 1978). The RICO venue provision
was modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4034 ("Section
1965 contains broad provisions regarding venue and process, which are modeled on
present antitrust legislation."), and it has long been recognized that the antitrust
venue provision supplemented, but did not supplant, the general venue statute, see
Albert Levine Assocs. v. Bertoni & Cotti, S.p.A., 314 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y
1970).
372. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1988).
373. See Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc., 657 F. Supp. at 1057 (collecting cases).
374. Lieb v. American Pac. Int'l, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(quoting Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
291 F. Supp. 252, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1968)); see also Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A., v.
Moraites, 377 F. Supp. 644, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying "place of injury" test for
venue).
375. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Ever-Dry Corp., 290 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (noting that "[a]lthough the claim arose also in other districts, that fact would
not derogate its having arisen here").
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properly in the chosen district, a motion to change venue 376
is addressed to "the discretion of the court."37 7 The moving
party bears the burden of establishing that there should be a
change of forum. "[W]here there is a mere balancing of
factors, the defendant will not have met his burden of proof,"
and the motion should be denied.
II. OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE LITIGANTS' USE
OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE RICO STATUTE
The federal government has paved the way for private
litigants to seek equitable RICO remedies against corrupted
labor unions. There are, nevertheless, several obstacles that
the private litigant will face in bringing such an action. First,
as a threshold matter, the private litigant will have to
convince the court that parties other than the government
have the right to seek equitable relief under the RICO statute.
Second, the private litigant will have to fight to obtain access
to many of the sources of information (such as wiretaps, grand
376. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.").
377. Sheet Metal Workers' Natl Pension Fund v. Gallagher, 669 F. Supp. 88, 91
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976). As one court has summarized:
The determination of whether an action should be transferred pursuant to
§ 1404(a) depends upon a balancing of many different factors. These factors
include not only convenience to the parties and witnesses but also the "relative
ease of access to proof, availability of witnesses .. .and 'all other practical
problems which make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.'"
Heyco, Inc. v. Heyman, 636 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Hall v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947))). A court should also consider "where the
operative facts occurred" when deciding a transfer motion. Id. at 1549.
378. Round One Prods., Inc. v. Greg Page Enters., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 934, 938
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 218 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Gallagher, 669 F. Supp. at 92 ("The
party seeking the transfer bears the burden of establishing that the transfer is
warranted, and that the balance of convenience weighs clearly in its favor."). This
allocation of the burden reflects "the overriding consideration that a plaintiffs choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed." Round One Prods., 566 F. Supp. at 938; accord
Fitzgerald, 521 F.2d at 451 (noting that "[a]lthough plaintiffs should rarely be
deprived of the advantages of their chosen forums, 'the doctrine leaves much to the
discretion of the court'" (quoting Fitzgerald v. Westland Marine Corp., 369 F.2d 499,
502 (2d Cir. 1966))); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Sugarman, 272 F.2d 679, 681 (2d
Cir. 1959).
636 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
jury material and the like) on which the government often
relies in maintaining civil RICO actions. Finally, the private
litigant will face the financial burden of complex and hotly
contested litigation. As we explain below, each of these
formidable obstacles can be surmounted.
A. The Private Litigant's Right to Equitable RICO Relief
The threshold legal question is whether a private litigant
has the right to seek equitable remedies under the RICO
statute. While commentators have endorsed the view that
private litigants may obtain equitable RICO relief,379 courts
have split on the issue."'
On its face, the RICO statute permits any litigant to seek
equitable relief. Section 1964(a) of the statute makes no
mention of a limitation on equitable actions by private
plaintiffs. Section 1964(a) provides as follows:
The district courts of the United States shall have juris-
diction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962
of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including,
but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself
of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise;
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to,
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of
379. See, e.g., Belgard, Private Civil RICO Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Equitable
Relief Under § 1964(a), 2 RICO L. Rep. (RICO L. Rep.) 537, 541 (1985); Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 237, 330-41 (1982); Goldberg, Cleaning Labor's House: Institutional Reform
Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903, 949; Note, The Availability
of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 945,
945 (1984) (authored by Donald R. Lee).
380. Compare Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088-
89 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that injunctive relief is unavailable to private civil RICO
plaintiffs), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987) and Kaushal v. State Bank, 556 F.
Supp. 576, 581-84 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same) with Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that equitable relief is
available to private civil RICO plaintiffs) and Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064
(8th Cir. 1982) (noting that the question is open, and that injunctive relief may be
available) and Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910-11
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same), affd on other grounds, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984).
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which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.81
Thus, section 1964(a) on its face gives federal courts authority
to grant equitable relief in civil RICO actions and does not
limit that authority to cases brought by the government.
To ensure that the government has standing to seek
equitable RICO relief, the statute does expressly provide that
the "Attorney General may institute proceedings under this
section" and, "[p]ending final determination thereof," obtain
from a court such relief as the court "shall deem proper."8 2
Finally, the statute permits "[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation" of RICO to
recover treble damages.38 3 Thus, on its face, the statute says
no more than: (i) any plaintiff may seek equitable RICO
remedies, (ii) the government has standing to seek equitable
RICO remedies, and (iii) the government has standing to seek
such remedies even if it cannot demonstrate injury to its
"business or property" necessary for a treble damage
award.38 4
This reading of the statute comports with the "Statement of
Findings and Purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act of
197035 and the statute's express direction that its provi-
sions "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
381. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988).
382. Id. § 1964(b). Section 1964(b) states in full: "The Attorney General may
institute proceedings under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the
court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such
other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall
deem proper." Id.
383. Id. § 1964(c). Section 1964(c) states in full: "Any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." Id.
384. The government is afforded standing to bring a civil RICO action for
equitable relief even though the government itself is not a "victim." Cf In re Debs,
158 U.S. 564, 584-86 (1895) (holding that the U.S. government has standing to seek
injunctive relief from wrongs that affect "the public at large" even when the
government itself has no pecuniary interest in the case). The private litigant, by
contrast, has standing to maintain a civil RICO action only if he or she suffered a
direct and concrete injury from a defendant's RICO violations.
385. Pub. L. No. 91-1152, 84 Stat. 922, 922. That section states that "[i]t is the
purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States
. .. by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime." Id., 84 Stat. at 923.
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purposes." 386 As one RICO commentator has suggested: "If
the text is plain, the remedy is there; if the text is ambiguous,
the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of enhancing the
remedial purpose of RICO."" 7
A few courts, however, have held that RICO does not permit
the private plaintiff to seek equitable relief under the stat-
ute. 38  The most significant of those authorities is Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim,"9 in which the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that private plaintiffs were not entitled to
equitable relief under the RICO statute because Congress
failed to pass two earlier versions of the RICO statute that
expressly provided standing for private litigants to obtain
equitable relief.
39 °
The Wollersheim court's reasoning is far from compelling
and ignores the statute's plain language. As another court has
explained:
[T]he fact that Congress did not pass earlier versions of
RICO containing provisions for private equitable relief is
by no means a clear indication that Congress intended to
deprive the district court of its traditional equity jurisdic-
tion to grant preliminary injunctive relief to a plaintiff
who could show irreparable injury resulting from a
defendant's alleged violation of § 1962. 39'
Moreover, there was no reason for Congress to include a
section expressly authorizing such relief in the RICO statute
because the statutory language already clearly granted that
386. Id. § 904(a), 84 Stat. at 947. This liberal mandate is unique in federal
criminal law. See supra note 25.
387. Note, supra note 379, at 953.
388. See, e.g., Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fueling Serv., 843 F.2d 821,830 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that RICO does not permit certain forms of preliminary
injunctions, but leaving open the question whether "all forms of injunctive or other
equitable relief are foreclosed to private plaintiffs under RICO"), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1103 (1987); Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088-
89 (9th Cir. 1986); Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1137-
38 (D.N.J. 1989); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 701 F. Supp. 701,
703-04 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Kaushal v. State Bank, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84 (N.D. Ill.
1983). See generally sources cited supra note 379.
389. 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
390. Id. at 1085-86.
391. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (citation omitted).
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authority.392  Thus, persuasive authorities recognize the
private litigant's right to seek equitable RICO remedies.
While the Supreme Court has yet to decide this issue, the
Court has consistently given liberal constructions to the RICO
statute. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly stated in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc393 that the RICO statute's
"'remedial purposes' are nowhere more evident than in the
provision of a private action for those injured by racketeering
activity."394 RICO's "remedial purposes" would undoubtedly
be furthered by a statutory construction that permitted private
plaintiffs to seek equitable RICO remedies.
Even if the Supreme Court concluded that private plaintiffs
are not authorized to seek equitable relief under the RICO
statute itself, private parties could still pursue other avenues.
For example, a private plaintiff could ask the court to exercise
its inherent equity powers. RICO actions necessarily include
claims that constitute the "predicate acts" of racketeering
necessary to make out a RICO offense. A federal court has the
authority, in the exercise of its inherent equity powers, to
enjoin such misconduct, irrespective of any statutory grant of
authority.395 Indeed, preliminary relief is available to pri-
vate plaintiffs under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.396 If the private plaintiff could show immediate
392. See Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540
(W.D. Pa. 1984) ("'A reasonable construction of Section 1964, therefore, is that both
private litigants and the Attorney General may seek remedies such as divestiture
and, in addition, the Attorney General may seek temporary restraining orders.'"
(quoting Fricano, Civil RICO-An Antitrust Plaintiffs Consideration, in 1 CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 827-28 (1983))).
393. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
394. Id. 498 (1985).
395. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 825 F.2d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir. 1987)
(granting injunctive relief in private RICO action based on district court's finding
that it had inherent power to do so on state law grounds); Chambers, 590 F. Supp.
at 1541 (recognizing "the federal court[s'] inherent power to grant equitable relief to
prevent irreparable injury from conduct prohibited by RICO"); Aetna Casualty, 570
F. Supp. at 910 (granting a preliminary injunction to a private RICO litigant after
finding that the traditional standards in that circuit for obtaining the preliminary
injunction were met). But see First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 701 F.
Supp. 701, 703 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (refusing to grant injunctive relief because its
jurisdiction in the case was based solely on RICO).
396. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (authorizing preliminary injunctive relief). United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 544 (W.D. Pa.) ("[T]he threatened
violation of the law here is itself sufficient public injury to justify the requested
relief."), affd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
Some courts may also require a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and
that the balance of equities favor the plaintiff. See, e.g., Dixie Carriers, Inc. v.
Channel Fueling Serv., Inc., 843 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1988).
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and irreparable injury-a heavy burden not required of the
government in civil RICO action-preliminary injunctive relief
might be ordered.
In sum, the private litigant should be able to obtain equita-
ble relief under the RICO statute. If not, the private litigant
may have other means of securing equitable relief under state
and federal law.
B. Obtaining Access to Confidential
Government Information
The private plaintiff may face problems obtaining access to
much of the evidence upon which the government typically
relies to show organized crime's influence over a union. Such
materials include FBI informant files and investigative
reports, grand jury testimony, and conversations intercepted
pursuant to court order. The private plaintiff, however, does
have some means of obtaining that information.
1. Freedom of Information Act-Many government reports,
including FBI files, may be obtained through requests made
under the Freedom of Information Act 397 (FOIA). Although
FOIA protects certain government documents from disclosure,
it permits public access to many files that could benefit the
private civil RICO litigant.398  Moreover, inquiries from
private parties may prompt further dialogue between the
government and those parties.
Because a plaintiff union member may have information
valuable to government investigators regarding his union's
association with organized crime, the government may be
willing to work with the union member as a source of informa-
tion. The government's information might help in the
plaintiffs civil RICO action, and the plaintiffs information
could aid the government in criminal prosecutions against
particular organized crime figures or corrupt union officers.
397. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
398. See Federal Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S.
340, 351-52 (1979) ("[T]he purpose of FOIA is 'to establish a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory
language.'"); Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir.1980) ("[T]he
overwhelming thrust of FOIA is toward complete disclosure.").
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2. Access to grand jury reports-Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure allows private plaintiffs access to
grand jury proceedings upon a showing of particularized
need.399 To show a "particularized need" for the information,
the plaintiff must show that such information is vital to his
case and cannot be obtained through discovery.4"0 If the
information cannot be obtained from another source and the
litigant wishes to use the grand jury transcript to impeach a
witness or test her credibility, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the "particularized need" test has been met.4'
Some courts may require the plaintiff to commence an inde-
pendent civil action to compel disclosure before the judge who
supervised the grand jury.40 2 Alternatively, the plaintiff may
simply make a motion to transfer grand jury transcripts.40 3
3. Title III materials-Members of organized crime often
have been the subject of government wiretaps and other
electronic interceptions of conversations as part of criminal
investigations. A substantial number of these recorded
conversations have been admitted into evidence in various
criminal trials.404  A private plaintiff may be able to use
these previously admitted recorded conversations in a subse-
quent civil RICO action.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968405 authorizes the use of electronic surveillance in the
investigation of certain serious offenses. 40 6  Title III limits
disclosure of materials gained by electronic surveillance to use
399. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
Specifically, Rule 6(e) provides that "[d]isclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of
matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made ... when so directed by
a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." FED R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(3).
400. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681-83.
401. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 n.12 (1979).
402. See, e.g., United States v. Alston, 491 F. Supp. 215, 216-17 (D.D.C. 1980).
403. See Alpha Portland Indus. v. United States Dist. Ct., 649 F.2d 387, 389 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 946 (1981).
404. For recent examples of intercepted wire conversations in criminal cases, see
United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling
that wiretap evidence was admissible against a member of a cocaine distributing
cartel); United States v. Apodaca, 820 F.2d 348, 350 (10th Cir. 1987) (same); United
States v. Weber, 808 F.2d 1422, 1424 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903
(1987).
405. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
406. These offenses are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1988), and include Hobbs
Act violations, see 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1988), and RICO violations, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1988).
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by "investigative or law enforcement officer[s]." 4°7 An "inves-
tigative or law enforcement officer" is defined as "any officer
of the United States or of a State or political subdivision
thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of
or to make arrests for offenses" enumerated in Title 111.408
Title III also provides that the government may disclose the
contents of an authorized wire communication while giving
testimony in state or federal court.4"' Typically, this disclo-
sure occurs in the course of a criminal trial where the govern-
ment wishes to use the results of electronic surveillance as
evidence.
Private plaintiffs may not, in the first instance, gain access
to Title III materials that have not been disclosed as evidence
in prior criminal proceedings.41 ° Courts have held, however,
that if such materials are used as evidence in a criminal case,
Title III creates no independent bar to the public's right of
access to the materials.41 Accordingly, Title III materials
that have been used as evidence in previous criminal cases
may be produced as evidence in a subsequent civil RICO
lawsuit. The private litigant may gain access to recordings of
electronically intercepted conversations obtained by the
government under Title III by serving a subpoena upon a
United States Attorney for release of the tapes and transcripts
of the conversations.41 2
4. Prior court proceedings-The easiest government records
for the private litigant to obtain are the transcripts and
exhibits of government actions, both civil and criminal. Court
proceedings generally are public, and records relating to them
are publicly available.4 3 Therefore, where the government
has already prevailed in a prosecution involving allegations of
labor union corruption, the private litigant has ready access to
a substantial body of evidence covering that union.
407. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (1988).
408. Id. § 2510(7).
409. See id. § 2517(3).
410. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51,
53-55 (2d Cir. 1984).
411. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1985);
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
412. See County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 369 (allowing plaintiffs to subpoena
a United States Attorney for release of Title III materials).
413. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ("It is
clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy...
judicial records and documents." (footnote omitted)).
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C. Funding the Private Litigant's Civil RICO Action
A civil RICO action against a labor union may place a
substantial financial burden on the private litigant. Funding
for the litigation, however, may be available from several
sources. For example, the RICO statute expressly provides for
an award of attorney fees and costs to a successful plaintiff in
a civil RICO action. Section 1964(c) states: "Any person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 . . . shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."414 Thus, if the private plaintiff is successful
in proving RICO violations, he will be entitled to costs and
fees. On that basis, a private litigant may be able to persuade
an attorney to take the case.
Other attorneys unwilling to take the case for a promise of
an attorney's fee in an amount that is subject to the discretion
of the court pursuant to § 1964(c) may accept the case if
promised a portion of the plaintiffs treble damage award.
Thus, the attorney would be retained on a contingent-fee basis
and would receive an agreed-upon percentage of whatever
damages the plaintiff recovers. Although most RICO plaintiffs
pursuing an action against their unions will seek equitable
relief, such plaintiffs may also seek money damages. Because
RICO authorizes courts to award treble damages to successful
plaintiffs, as much as one-third of those awards could go to the
attorneys without substantially depleting the amounts
recovered by plaintiffs.
Another option available to the private litigant is to per-
suade the court to order the defendant union to fund certain
aspects of the action. A civil RICO lawsuit brought by a union
member is an action undertaken on behalf of the union, and
each member of the union will obtain a substantial benefit if
the litigation is successful. It follows that the union should be
required to pay for the action. Although no court has held yet
that a union may be required to fund a RICO action brought
by a union member, such an argument is worth making.
The suggestion that a court may order a defendant to pay
some of the plaintiffs costs of litigation is not unprecedented.
414. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
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If civil RICO plaintiffs bring their case as a class action, they
may be able to convince the court to require defendants to pay
the plaintiff's notification costs prior to final judgment. Courts
have inherent equitable power to require either party to a
class action to pay the costs of communicating with class
members concerning the conduct of the litigation. 4" Al-
though the Supreme Court, in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,"6 set forth the general rule that a class represen-
tative must bear the costs of notifying absent class members
that the action has been instituted, 1 7 the Court also recog-
nized, without expressing an opinion, a possible exception to
this rule where there is a preexisting fiduciary relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant.41 8  In such a case, a
court may require the defendant to pay for the cost of notify-
ing absent class members. The fiduciary relationship between
a union and its members may support application of these
same principles in a private civil RICO action.41 9
Another example of defendants paying the costs of litigation
appears in cases in which receivers have been appointed. As
a general rule, the costs of a receiver are paid out of the funds
or property in receivership °.4 " This same rule has been
applied against a labor union in a civil RICO case. In United
415. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
416. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
417. Id. at 177. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) requires that potential class members in
a Rule 23(b)(3) action be notified of the suit and provided with the opportunity to
request that they be excluded from the class.
418. The Court noted that "where a fiduciary duty pre-existed between the
plaintiff and defendant, as in a shareholder derivative suit," a departure from the
rule may be warranted. 417 U.S. at 178; see also Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc.,
20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 125, 128-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting the fiduciary duty
exception but refusing to apply it where it was impossible to tell if the suit was
meritorious). And in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 361-63
(1978), although the Court held that $16,000 was too substantial a sum to require the
defendant to pay toward communicating with the class, it did not rule out the notion
of a defendant paying such costs prior to judgment.
419. The Supreme Court has characterized the duty owed by a union to its
members as analogous to the fiduciary duty in the corporate context. See Air Line
Pilot's Ass'n v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1991).
420. "Generally, the courts hold that a receiver's compensation and the expenses
necessarily incurred by him in preserving and caring for the property under an order
of court are primarily a charge on and should be paid out of the fund of property in
his hands." SEC v. Investors Sec. Leasing Corp., 476 F. Supp. 837, 844 (W.D. Pa.
1979); accord O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, 677 F. Supp. 807, 822 (E.D. Pa. 1988); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 (1959) (stating that expenses of the
administration of the trust are charged to the property of the trust).
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991
States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roof-
ers,421 the court, in response to the government's request for
preliminary relief, imposed a "decreeship" over a union
local.422  As part of the decreeship, the court appointed a
court liaison officer to administer and enforce the provisions
of the decree.423 The court further ruled that "all costs
incurred in the administration of the decreeship" would be
borne by the union local or its affiliated entities.424 Courts
unquestionably have the power to require union defendants to
pay the costs of preliminary relief in a civil RICO action.
A plaintiff that brings a civil RICO lawsuit can use these
examples when arguing that the court has the authority to
require union defendants to pay various costs of the litigation
and that such a ruling would be consistent with the union's
fiduciary obligations. Indeed, all union members arguably
would benefit from a successful action.
As a final alternative, private plaintiffs may be able to
obtain pro bono or public interest representation.425 The
private plaintiff may look also to public interest groups, such
as the Association for Union Democracy,46 for assistance in
fund-raising. Thus, while funding the action may prove
challenging, that same challenge exists for any union reformer
who goes to court to vindicate union members' rights.
III. CONCLUSION
The RICO statute is a powerful tool for reforming labor
unions that have become corrupted by organized crime. The
federal government has used this tool with great success in a
series of recent cases. The resources available to the federal
421. 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1989).
422. Id. at 1168.
423. Id. at 1169.
424. Id. at 1174.
425. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union appeared on behalf of the
Teamsters for a Democratic Union, a union dissident group, in the government's civil
RICO action against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. See L.A. Times,
July 12, 1990, pt. D, at 7, col. 1.
426. The Association for Union Democracy, based in Brooklyn, New York, is a non-
profit organization that seeks to promote the democratic rights of union members.
See Kilborn, Unions at a Loss to Reverse Falling Futures of Workers, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1991, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (late ed.).
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government, however, are not unlimited. Moreover, the
government has indicated that the RICO statute is an "ex-
traordinary" weapon to be used "very sparingly."427 As a
result, the federal government can be expected to seek to
reform only the most egregious cases of unions that have been
corrupted by organized crime.
The cases brought by the government, however, have
established important precedents for reform of corrupted labor
unions. Private litigants may be able to take these precedents
and apply them in private civil RICO actions. The focus of
this Article has been on the challenging obstacles that are
likely to arise in private civil RICO actions. Many of these
problems have already been addressed and overcome in the
civil RICO actions brought by the government. The private
civil RICO litigant should not have to "reinvent the wheel" on
those issues. The private litigant will also face many other
unique obstacles. Many of these problems, however, can be
anticipated and overcome. The purpose of this Article has
been to serve as a "road map" around both the common and
the unique obstacles. This road map, of course, does not
guarantee success. Some potential problems in bringing a
private civil RICO action simply cannot be predicted. The
RICO statute, however, holds great promise for the honest
members and officials of trade unions throughout the country
who are truly interested in fostering union democracy and
honest trade unionism by every available means.
427. RICO Hearings, supra note 9, at 57 (statement of Benito Romano, United
States Attorney, Southern District of New York).
